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INTRODUCTION
This Article reflects on the future of investment treaties and investorstate dispute settlement (“ISDS”) in light of failed negotiations for a
Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”) between the
European Union (“EU”) and the United States, successful negotiations
for a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”)
between the EU and Canada, and the political environment on both sides
of the Atlantic. In so doing, it emphasizes five points. Part I asserts that
investment treaty disputes often represent political disputes, at least for
respondent states.1 Drawing on social science literature, Part II considers
the possibility that stakeholders and officeholders systematically make

* Professor of Law, Wayne State Law School.
1. See infra notes 6–28 (overviewing the usual nature of disputes that involve respondent states
and demonstrating that these disputes are often political); see also Charles H. Brower II, Obstacles
and Pathways to Consideration of the Public Interest in Investment Treaty Disputes, in YEARBOOK
ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2008–2009, 347, 348–56 (Karl P. Sauvant ed.,
2009) (asserting that investment treaty disputes are political disputes).
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irrational choices on political issues in democratic systems. 2 Part III
describes how those forces have arguably shaped the EU’s articulation of
a dramatically new vision for investor-state dispute settlement in TTIP
and CETA.3 Part IV argues that one must cautiously approach
revolutionary changes to ISDS possibly grounded in bliss beliefs and
ideology.4 Finally, Part V addresses concerns that the existing regime for
investor-state arbitration replicates the problems of democratic
dysfunction, with party-appointed arbitrators indulging the subjective
and possibly irrational preferences of appointing parties in order to secure
future appointments.5
I. INVESTMENT TREATY DISPUTES ARE POLITICAL DISPUTES
Starting with the political character of investment treaty disputes, one
should pause to observe that claims under investment treaties almost
always involve challenges to the public acts,6 and often to the public
regulatory acts,7 of host states. In addition, they tend to cluster around
2. See infra notes 29–71 (exploring the theory that certain political choices systematically have
an irrational component in democratic systems).
3. See infra notes 72–96 (applying the irrational choice theory to the European Union’s new
vision for investor-state disputes); see also Ian A. Laird, TPP and ISDS: The Challenge from
Europe and the Proposed TTIP Investment Court, 40 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 106, 108 (2016) (describing
the EU’s “dramatic, new proposal” for ISDS in TTIP); Stephan W. Schill, The European
Commission’s Proposal of an “Investment Court System” for TTIP: Stepping Stone or Stumbling
Block for Multilateralizing International Investment Law?, ASIL INSIGHTS (Apr. 22, 2016),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/9/european-commissions-proposal-investmentcourt-system-ttip-stepping (describing the EU’s proposal for an international investment court as a
“historic turning point” in reorienting ISDS from a private-law to a public-law process); cf. Barnali
Choudhury, 2015: The Year of Reorienting International Investment Law, ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 5,
2016),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/3/2015-year-reorienting-internationalinvestment-law (asserting that the EU’s proposal for an international investment court “completely
overhauls the current system of investor-state dispute settlement”).
4. See infra notes 97–130 (expressing the need for caution with respect to dramatic changes to
the current ISDS framework).
5. See infra notes 131–209 (addressing concerns about democratic dysfunction within the
current ISDS system).
6. See Brower, supra note 1, at 351 (noting that investment disputes “seek to impose state
responsibility based on acts jure imperii, for which the respondent states would normally enjoy
sovereign immunity under customary international law”); Gus Van Harten, The Public-Private
Distinction in the International Arbitration of Individual Claims Against the State, 56 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 371, 379 (2007) (discussing the nature of investment arbitration claims and the unique
position of the State in these disputes); Alexis Blane, Note, Sovereign Immunity as a Bar to the
Execution of International Arbitral Awards, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 453, 488 (2009) (“Most
of the acts that give rise to liability . . . are those that are undertaken by the state in its public
character. . . .”); see also Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/08,
Award, ¶¶ 246–53 (Feb. 6, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/documents/Siemens-ArgentinaAward.pdf (explaining that states must normally engage in sovereign activities as opposed to
commercial activities in order to incur responsibility under investment treaties).
7. See Noam Zamir & Paul Barker, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and States’ Right
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politically sensitive topics,8 such as the distribution of energy,9 allocation
of natural resources,10 environmental regulation,11 hazardous waste

to Regulate under International Investment Law, 45 DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 205, 210 (2017)
(observing that “most investment treaty claims . . . seek to impugn general regulatory measures
directed at environmental protection, public health, prudential economic regulation or other key
public welfare interests”); see also Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication,
61 DUKE L.J. 775, 839–40 (2012) (indicating that “ICSID proceedings frequently
involve . . . important issues of . . . national regulatory competence”); Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither
Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 875, 895 (2011):
The cases relating to the Argentine economic crisis, [and] also several NAFTA disputes
in which investors challenged what the respondent state argued to be legitimate
regulatory action to protect the public interest, such as the protection of public health,
the environment, or labour standards, raised the concern about how much ‘regulatory
space’ investment treaties left.
8. See Laird, supra note 3, at 108 (explaining that “the issues raised in investment arbitration
are frequently of highly charged political nature”).
9. See, e.g., Windstream Energy LLC v. Gov’t of Canada, PCA Case No. 2013–22, Award
(Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2036; TransCanada Corp. &
TransCanada PipeLines Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/21, Request for Arbitration
(June 24, 2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/259329.pdf; Mesa Power Grp.
LLC v. Gov’t of Canada, PCA Case No. 2012–17, Award (Mar. 24, 2016),
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1675; Teco Guat. Holdings LLC v. Republic of
Guatemala,
ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/10/17,
Award
(Dec.
19,
2013),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3035.pdf; Sempra Energy Int’l v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28, 2007),
https://italaw.com/documents/SempraAward.pdf; Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007), https:// italaw.com/documents/Enron-Award.pdf; CMS
Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005),
44 I.L.M 1205 (2005); see also Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 42 (2007) (finding that energy was “the most heavily
arbitrated sector” under investment treaties, likely due to the scale of investments in energy
projects, the long time periods involved, and their political sensitivity).
10. See Irene M. Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 44
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1109, 1118 (2012) (observing that “a significant portion of investment
disputes concern natural resources”); see also Georges R. Delaume, Economic Development and
Sovereign Immunity, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 319, 339–40 n.76 (1985) (providing “examples of disputes
concerning traditional types of investment, . . . [including] disputes arising out of agreements
relating to . . . the exploitation of natural resources, such as bauxite mining . . . , oil exploitation
and exploration . . . , and forestry exploitation”); Cornel Marian, Balancing Transparency: The
Value of Administrative Law and Mathews-Balancing to Investment Treaty Arbitrations, 10 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 275, 281 (2010) (“Historically investment arbitrations involved disputes over
natural resources and regulatory issues closely tied to national sovereignty.”); cf. Josh Vaughan,
Note, Arbitration in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring: From Uprisings to Awards, 28 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 491, 494 (2013) (noting that the “procurement of natural resources often requires
high levels of foreign investment, and may serve as an area of future investment disputes”).
11. See, e.g., Clayton v. Gov’t of Canada, PCA Case No. 2009–04, Award on Jurisdiction and
Liability (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1287; Methanex Corp. v.
United States, Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf.
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disposal,12 taxation,13 financial regulation,14 public procurement,15
official corruption,16 the integrity of local courts,17 communications

12. See, e.g., Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0854.pdf; S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, Second Partial Award (Oct. 21,
2002), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/dispdiff/myers-review-02.pdf; Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0510.pdf.
13. See, e.g., EnCana Corp. v. Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3481, Award (Feb. 3, 2006),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0285_0.pdf; Occidental Expl. & Prod.
Co. v. Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3467, Final Award (July 1, 2004),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0571.pdf; Feldman v. Mexico,
ICSID
Case
No.
ARB(AF)/99/1,
Award
(Dec.
16,
2002),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0319.pdf.
14. See, e.g., Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award (Mar. 17, 2006),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf.
15. See, e.g., Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Gov’t of Canada, PCA Case No. 2012–17, Award, ¶¶
404–66 (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1675; United Parcel Serv. of
Am. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/02/1, Award on the Merits, ¶¶ 121–36 (May 24, 2007),
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/ups00.pdf; ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, ¶¶ 147–74 (Jan.
9, 2003), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16586.pdf.
16. See, e.g., ECE Projektmanagement Int’l v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case Νο. 2010–5,
Award, ¶¶ 4.871–4.932 (Sept. 19, 2013), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw4258.pdf (considering, but rejecting, investment treaty claims based on
allegations of official corruption); EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13,
Award, ¶¶ 221–237 (Oct. 8, 2009), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0267.pdf (considering, but rejecting, claims that Romanian officials solicited a USD
$2.5 million bribe); Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009–23, Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶
43,
50–53
(Sept.
23,
2009),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0155_0.pdf (alleging political interference, judicial predisposition in favor of local
plaintiffs, and solicitation of bribery); World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case
No.
ARB/00/7,
Award,
¶¶
130–88
(Oct.
4
2006),
https://www.italaw.com/documents/WDFv.KenyaAward.pdf (finding that the claimant paid a $2
million bribe to secure presidential approval for an investment agreement, finding that bribery
violates international public policy, and concluding that the circumstances authorized the host state
to void the agreement that formed the basis of the investor’s claim).
17. See, e.g., Loewen Grp., Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (June
26, 2003), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf; Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United
States,
ICSID
Case
No.
ARB(AF)/99/2,
Award
(Oct.
11,
2002),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/14442.pdf; Chevron Corp., PCA Case No. 2009–
23, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0155_0.pdf.
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heritage,20

18. See, e.g., Rumeli Telekom A.S. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16,
Award (July 29, 2008), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0728.pdf;
Telenor Mobile Commc’ns A.S. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Award
(Sept. 13, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0858.pdf; Nagel v.
Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 049/2002, Final Award (Sept. 9, 2003),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0551.pdf; CME Czech B.V. v. Czech
Republic, Final Award (Mar. 14, 2003), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0180.pdf; Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award (Sept. 3, 2001),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0451.pdf; see also Eric Gottwald,
Leveling the Playing Field: Is it Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing Nations in
Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 239 n.3 (2007) (discussing a
sampling of claims, including “France Telecom’s $2.9 billion claim against Lebanon over its
contract to construct and run a Lebanese mobile phone network [and] . . . U.S. cellular
communications company Motorola’s $2 billion claim against the Republic of Turkey over its
investment in a Turkish mobile phone system”).
19. See, e.g., R.R. Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Award
(June 29, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1051.pdf; Malicorp
Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/18, Award (Feb. 7, 2011),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0499.pdf; Walter Bau AG v.
Thailand, UNCITRAL, Award (July 1, 2009), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0067.pdf; Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of
Philippines,
ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/03/25,
Award
(Aug.
16,
2007),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0340.pdf; see also Lise Johnson &
Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contracts, Host-State “Commitments” and the Myth of Stability
in International Law, 24 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 361, 364 (2013) (reporting that 11 percent of
investor-state arbitrations administered by ICSID involve the transportation sector).
20. See Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, PCA Case No. 2010–5, Award, ¶¶ 50, 80–82, 103–
05, 167–77, 795, 804–06 (June 8, 2009), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf
(involving a claim based on regulations requiring backfilling and re-grading of an extensive surface
mining facility located in close proximity to Native American cultural sites); United Parcel Serv.
of Am. v. Canada, An Arbitration under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement,
Award on the Merits, ¶ 169 (May 24, 2007), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreementsaccords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/ups-00.pdf (involving the application of the cultural
industries exception of NAFTA’s investment chapter to measures designed “to connect Canadians
to each other through the provision of accessible Canadian cultural products and to sustain and
develop the Canadian publishing industry”); S. Pac. Props. (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Award (May 20, 1992), 3 ICSID Rep. 189 (1995) (involving a
plan to build a tourist village near the Pyramids at Giza).
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affirmative action,21 pharmaceuticals,22 and tobacco control.23
Furthermore, the motivations for the regulatory shifts that trigger
investment treaty disputes often include some combination of changes in
political administration,24 abrupt changes in policy,25 as well as political,
21. See, e.g., Foresti v. Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award (Aug.
4, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0337.pdf.
22. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, Case No. UNCT/14/2, Final Award (Mar. 16,
2017),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3544/DC10133_En.pdf;
Apotex Holdings Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award (Aug. 25, 2014),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/233043.pdf; Apotex Inc. v. United States, ICSID
Case No. UNCT/10/2, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (June 14, 2013),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1550.pdf; Les Laboratoires
Servier,
S.A.S.
v.
Poland,
UNCITRAL,
Final
Award
(Feb.
14,
2012),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3005.pdf; see also Valentina
Vadi, New Forms of Dialectics between Intellectual Property and Public Health: Pharmaceutical
Patent-Related Investment Disputes, 49 INT’L LAW. 149, 165 (2015) (noting that recent years have
seen “a growing number of investor-state arbitrations concerned [with] the way host states govern
the pharmaceutical sector”).
23. See, e.g., Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7,
Award
(July
8,
2016),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw7417.pdf; Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, PCA Case No. 2012–12, Award
on
Jurisdiction
and
Admissibility
(Dec.
17,
2015),
https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1711.
24. See, e.g., Eureko B.V. v. Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008–13, Award on Jurisdiction,
Admissibility and Suspension, ¶ 7 (Oct. 26, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0309.pdf (involving a change of government in Slovakia); Siemens A.G. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 273 (Feb. 6, 2007),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0790.pdf (involving a change in
presidential administrations in Argentina); Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶¶ 37–39 (Oct. 11, 2002), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita1076.pdf (involving a change in mayoral administrations in Boston, Massachusetts);
Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., Award (Aug. 24, 1978), 56 I.L.R.
258, 269 (1980) (involving a change in government in Jamaica); see also Charles N. Brower, Judge,
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Manley O. Hudson Medal Lecture, The Evolution of the
International Judiciary: Denationalization Through Jurisdictional Fragmentation, 103 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 171, 183 (2009) (indicating that investment treaty claims “often com[e] as the result
of a change in government”); Luke Eric Peterson, In Lead-Up to Election, Republic of Georgia
Lost One Investor Arbitration, and Settled Another, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION REPORTER (Nov.
11, 2012), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/in-lead-up-to-election-republic-of-georgia-lost-oneinvestor-arbitration-and-settled-another (discussing Karmer Marble Tourism Constr. Indus. &
Commerce LLC v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/19, in which an ICSID tribunal found that
the investor’s “contract to develop a highway was illegally terminated following [a] . . . change in
government in Georgia”).
25. See supra note 24 (discussing arbitrations all involving changes of government, with
incoming administrations criticizing the policies adopted by their predecessors and seeking to
change the rules of the game); see also RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 22 (2d ed. 2012) (indicating that the “central political
risk . . . for . . . foreign investor[s] lies in a change of the position of the host government . . .” and
explaining that such changes “become[] more likely with every subsequent change of
government . . .”); cf. Charles H. Brower II, Trans-Pacific Partnership: Continuity and
Breakthroughs in U.S. Investment Treaty Practice, 27 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 145, 147–49 (2016)
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economic, and/or social upheaval in host states.26 In other words,
investment treaty disputes often occur in highly politicized contexts,27
(describing the development of bilateral investment treaties as part of a response to “the expansion
of communism and the process of decolonization[, which] led to changes of government and
dramatic shifts in policy across the globe” during the decades leading up to the 1970s).
26. For example, after a financial crisis that provoked riots, inflicted grave economic losses, and
caused the succession of five presidential administrations over the course of ten days in Argentina,
foreign investors brought dozens of investment treaty claims, seeking damages that exceeded the
nation’s financial reserves. Brower, supra note 1, at 349–50 (discussing the Argentine financial
crisis and the ensuing claims brought against the government by foreign investors); see also LG&E
Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 63, 216,
231–36
(Oct.
3,
2006),
[hereinafter
LG&E
Award],
http://www.investmentclaims.com/IIC_152_(2006).pdf (describing the events that transpired
during the financial crisis of 2001 in Argentina); GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 1–2 (1st ed. 2007) (describing the series of events which led to
the 2001 Argentine financial collapse and, eventually, the filing of dozens of investment arbitration
claims by foreign investors for “an estimated $17 billion in claimed compensation,” which was
“nearly the entire annual budget of the national government”); William W. Burke-White & Andreas
von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of
Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 309,
311 (2008) (examining the Argentine financial crisis and observing that “Argentina has become
subject to no fewer than forty-three ICSID arbitrations brought by investors who assert that
Argentina's response to the crisis harmed investments protected by various BITs”).
As a second example, Venezuela is in the midst of a longstanding political, economic, and social
crisis, in which the country has ceased to be a democracy, per capita GDP has fallen by more than
one-third since 2012, the population faces widespread malnutrition due to food shortages,
homicides exceed 20,000 annually and go unpunished, looting has become endemic, and armed
bands control significant areas of the country. Power Without the People: Averting Venezuela’s
Breakdown, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (June 19, 2017), https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-americacaribbean/andes/venezuela/b036power-without-people-averting-venezuelas-breakdown; see Katia
Porzecanski, Investing in Venezuela Could Be Hugely Profitable or Potentially Lethal,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-11/scarierthan-default-risks-loom-for-bond-investors-in-venezuela (describing Venezuela as “one of the
globe’s most dangerous places,” based on a “collapse in oil prices” that “deepened the [country’s]
economic crisis and exacerbated food shortages,” with the result that Venezuela also suffers from
“widespread” crime, the world’s third-highest murder rate, and a growing practice of vigilante
justice that includes “mob lynchings”).
Not surprisingly, the political, economic and social crisis rippling through Venezuela has caused
dislocations that led to the assertion of at least forty-one investment treaty claims at ICSID, “more
than three times that [asserted against] any neighbors save Argentina.” See Caroline Simson, A
Cheat Sheet to Venezuela’s Disputes at ICSID, LAW360 (July 29, 2016, 7:38 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/822707/a-cheat-sheet-to-venezuela-s-disputes-at-icsid
(discussing the frequent claims brought against Venezuela at ICSID, forty-one in total, second only
to Argentina); see also UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2017: INVESTMENT AND THE
DIGITAL
ECONOMY
115
(2017)
[hereinafter
UNCTAD
WIR
2017],
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf (listing Venezuela as the second most
frequent target of investment treaty claims, with forty-one claims brought against that state); SCOTT
MILLER & GREGORY N. HICKS, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: A REALITY CHECK 8
(Ctr. for Strategic and Int’l Studies, Jan. 2015) (indicating that “disputes tend to arise in host
economies with poor rule-of-law records,” with Argentina ranking as the most frequent respondent
state (fifty-three claims) and Venezuela ranking second (thirty-six claims)).
27. Brower, supra note 24, at 183 (noting the politically charged nature of issues coming before
international tribunals); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of
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and can be seen as challenges to the normal operation of political
processes of host states,28 which could be good or bad depending on
whether one views those processes as likely to produce rational and
beneficial outcomes.
II. STAKEHOLDERS AND OFFICEHOLDERS SYSTEMATICALLY MAKE
IRRATIONAL CHOICES ON POLITICAL ISSUES IN DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS
Turning to political behavior, a growing body of literature indicates
that stakeholders and even officeholders systematically make irrational
decisions on political issues in democratic systems. 29 One can see this
Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute Resolution, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 138, 141 (2007) (opining
that “investor-State disputes are political in nature and often become highly politicized”); see
Catherine A. Rogers, The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators, 12 SANTA CLARA J.
INT’L L. 223, 240 (2013) (opining that investment arbitration “operates in a volatile and politically
charged environment”); Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign
Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1550,
1611 (2009) (concluding that the “creation of foreign investment law and policy is necessarily a
political task, entailing in some instances sensitive decisions about the allocation of valuable rights,
or about the ‘allocation of power’”) (quoting Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The
Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (1959))).
28. See CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 324 (1st ed. 2014)
(recognizing that “investment arbitration is often viewed as pitting investor interests against
defenders of State policy interests”); Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International
Investment Law, 13 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 155, 156 (2007) (describing investment treaties in terms
of a legal regime that empowers foreign investors to “resist the forces of change often demanded
by the political and economic life in host countries”); see also Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin,
Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121,
146 (2006) (observing that “[i]nvestment arbitration tribunals apply standards that constrain
sovereign acts of a state’s legislature, judiciary and administration,” and thus serve “as a mechanism
to control the exercise of public authority”).
29. See generally JASON BRENNAN, AGAINST DEMOCRACY (Princeton Univ. Press 2016)
(critiquing the democratic process and examining numerous theories about the electorate); BRYAN
CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES
(Princeton Univ. Press 2007) [hereinafter CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER]
(analyzing why democracies choose bad policies); Michael Huemer, Why People Are Irrational
about Politics, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 456 (Jonathan
Anomaly et al., eds. 2016) (arguing that political disagreements are “very widespread,” “strong,”
and “persistent,” and concluding that “human beings are highly unreliable at identifying correct
political claims” because “individual derive psychological rewards from holding certain political
beliefs”) (emphasis original); Larry M. Bartels, The Irrational Electorate, THE WILSON
QUARTERLY (Fall 2008), https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/fall-2008-the-glory-and-thefolly/the-irrational-electorate/ (concluding that voters reward whomever is in power when the
country is doing well and thus are irrational when voting); Eyal Winter, Voting Is Irrational.
Emotions
Always
Win,
THE
GUARDIAN
(May
7,
2015,
2:11
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/07/voting-irrational-emotions-politicsideology (suggesting that voters are driven by an ideological craving that motivates their choice at
the polls); Bryan Caplan, Rational Irrationality and the Microfoundations of Political Failure
(Indep.
Inst.,
Working
Paper
No.
7,
Oct.
1999),
http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/bcaplan/pdfs/rationalirrationalityandmicro.pdf [hereinafter Caplan,
Rational Irrationality] (building on Bryan Caplan’s model of “rational irrationality” and further
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phenomenon by comparing politics and religion, both areas in which
disagreements are strong, widespread, and persistent.30 At social events,
one tends to avoid discussions of politics and religion because those
topics routinely function as gateways to emotionally intense and stubborn
disagreements. If people’s differences on these topics were mostly
cognitive, there would be much less room for debate.31 When exposed to
the same facts, rational people would tend to reach similar conclusions
on the benefits and drawbacks associated with policies relating to
immigration, economic development, counterterrorism, gun control, and
even the protection of foreign investment.32 The persistence of fierce and
widespread debates across a large range of political issues indicates that
stakeholders and officeholders do not behave like rational political
actors.33
To understand why stakeholders do not behave like rational political
actors, consider the circumstances that support rational action. In the
practical aspects of life, we have strong incentives to gather information
and make wise choices. When purchasing computers or automobiles,
Consumer Reports and other rating services offer easy access to reliable
examining the rationality of voters).
30. See Huemer, supra note 29, at 456 (observing that only religion and morality rival politics
as a source of disagreement, and pointing out that political disagreements tend to be widespread,
strong and persistent); see also CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at
100 (“In a secular age, politics and economics have displaced religion itself as the focal point for
passionate conviction and dogmatism.”).
31. See CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 101 (“If ignorance
were the sole cause of error, sufficiently large doses of information would be a cognitive
panacea.”); Huemer, supra note 29, at 457 (“If political disputes had a purely cognitive explanation,
we would expect them to be more easily resolvable.”).
32. As a British professor of economics explains:
Imagine a world in which ideology was ruled by rationality without any biases. In such
a world there would be little room for political debate among intelligent people. If we
were all exposed to the same facts we would end up reaching the same conclusions. We
would still need parties and elections since our interests are not identical. But we would
never remain split over questions such as which economic policy would benefit the most
British people, or which policy would be most effective for tackling terrorism.
Winter, supra note 29; see also Huemer, supra note 29, at 457 (indicating that if rational actors had
different information, “they could simply meet, share their information, and then come to an
agreement” on political issues).
33. See Winter, supra note 29 (“The fact that we continue to debate these issues endlessly, and
yet never seem to agree, suggests that there is something in ideologies far beyond rationality.”); see
also CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 115 (“Though initially
jarring, it is coherent to assert that people are rational in some areas but not in others. Irrational
beliefs probably play a role in all human activities, but politics makes the ‘short list’ of areas where
irrationality is exceptionally pronounced.”); Bartels, supra note 29 (discussing a study conducted
during the early 1950s by researchers at Columbia University, who concluded that “electoral
choices ‘are relatively invulnerable to direct argumentation’ and ‘characterized more by faith than
by conviction and by wishful expectation rather than careful prediction of consequences’”).
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information about the options, meaning that we face low information
costs. When we make good choices, we actually get the products we want
and we experience all the benefits that flow from those choices.34 When
we ignore information or make poor choices, we get bad products and we
experience all of the associated losses.35 The same holds true in the
employment context, where systematic errors in judgment entail large
personal costs. For example, regular overestimation of job performance
while intoxicated vastly increases the likelihood of termination and longterm career setbacks.36 Similarly, most people think rationally about
traffic patterns when crossing streets.37 When people see a Mack truck
approaching, they don’t assume they are seeing an optical illusion.38 The
stakes are too high; mistakes will result in serious injury or death.39 The
point is that the correlation between erroneous beliefs and personal costs
establishes a discipline that supports rational decisionmaking. Given the
ease of making good choices, the rewards for making good choices, and
the penalties for making bad choices, we tend to act rationally in the
practical aspects of life.
In the non-practical aspects of life, we have much weaker incentives
to gather information and make wise choices. When assessing candidates,
policies, and officeholders, we do not have the equivalent of Consumer
Reports, meaning that the costs of becoming informed increase
dramatically. Even when we invest in gathering information and make
good choices, we don’t actually get the candidate or the policy we want.40
34. See Huemer, supra note 29, at 460 (“If you take the time to read Consumer Reports to
determine which kind of car to buy, you then get that car.”); Jason Brennan, Trump Won Because
Voters Are Ignorant, Literally, FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 10, 2016, 2:33 PM),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/10/the-dance-of-the-dunces-trump-clinton-election-republicandemocrat/ (“Consider: If you go to buy a car, you do your research. After all, if you make a smart
choice, you reap the rewards. . . .”).
35. See CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 14 (“When a
consumer has mistaken beliefs about what to buy, he foots the bill.”); id. at 94 (“In markets, if
individuals know too little, they pay the price in missed opportunities. . . .”); Brennan, supra note
34 (noting that when people make bad choices about automobile purchases, they “suffer the
consequences”); Caplan, Rational Irrationality, supra note 29, at 4 (observing that “systematic
errors about non-political issues often have large private, marginal costs”).
36. Caplan, Rational Irrationality, supra note 29, at 4 (noting that one’s career will likely be
ruined if one engages in “over estimating job performance while intoxicated”).
37. BRENNAN, supra note 29, at 23 (discussing the rational logic implemented in deciding
whether it is safe to cross the street).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Huemer, supra note 29, at 460 (observing that “if you take the time to research
politicians’ records to find out which politician to vote for, you do not thereby get that politician.
You still get the politician that the majority of other people voted for. . . .”); Caleb Crain, None of
the Above: The Case Against Democracy, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 7, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/07/the-case-against-democracy (explaining that
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We get only one vote and our voice is so small that it makes no difference
to the outcome,41 and therefore it makes no sense to incur the costs of
becoming informed.42 As voters, we rationally choose ignorance.43
In addition to ignorance, voters face a number of incentives to act
irrationally.44 When it comes to political issues, most voters have
strongly held beliefs about things like terrorism, gun control,
immigration, and international trade. While often erroneous or at least not
grounded in fact, those beliefs frequently create a strong sense of
satisfaction for adherents;45 for example, by providing an emotional
“even if you read up on candidates for civil-court judge on Patch.com, it may still be the crook who
gets elected”).
41. See BRENNAN, supra note 29, at 31 (noting that “the probability a person will break a tie is
vanishingly small,” and that individuals “are more likely to win Powerball a few times in a row
than to cast a tie-breaking vote”); CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29,
at 94 (“One vote is extraordinarily unlikely to change an election’s outcome.”).
42. See BRENNAN, supra note 29, at 31–32 (“Individual citizens have almost no power over
government, and individual votes have almost zero expected value. Citizens don’t invest in
acquiring political knowledge because knowledge doesn’t pay. Regardless of whether citizens have
altruistic or selfish political preferences, it is not worth their time to be well informed about
politics.”); CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 2 (“Economists have
long argued that voter ignorance is a predictable response to the fact that one vote doesn’t matter.
Why study the issues if you can’t change the outcome?”); id. at 94 (“If time is money, acquiring
political information takes time, and the expected personal benefit of voting is roughly zero, a
rational, selfish individual chooses to be ignorant.”).
43. See CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 94 (quoting ANTHONY
DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 259 (1957)) (noting that “it is irrational to be
politically well-informed because the low returns from data simply do not justify their cost in time
and other resources”); Huemer, supra note 29, at 460 (“The theory of Rational Ignorance holds that
people often choose—rationally—to remain ignorant because the costs of collecting information
are greater than the expected value of the information. This is very often true of political
information.”); Brennan, supra note 34 (“Most voters are ignorant or misinformed because the costs
to them of acquiring political information greatly exceed the potential benefits.”).
Most stakeholders remain ignorant of such things as the party that controls Congress, the number
of senators from their state, the names of incumbents and, of course, their voting records. See
BRENNAN, supra note 29, at 25 (indicating that citizens generally cannot identify which party
controls Congress); CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 95 (noting
that about half of voters know that each state has two senators, and only a quarter knows the length
of their term in office); see also Huemer, supra note 29, at 460 (indicating that most people cannot
identify their congressperson, and that laypeople do not know the last vote taken in Congress);
Brennan, supra note 34 (noting that voters generally “don’t know which party controls Congress,
what Congress has done recently, whether the economy is getting better or worse (or by how
much)”); Crain, supra note 40, at 67 (indicating that about a third of American voters are “incapable
of naming even one of the three branches of the United States government,” that only half know
that their state has two senators, and that less than a quarter can identify their senators by name).
44. See CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 2 (“The central idea
is that voters are worse than ignorant; they are, in a word, irrational—and vote accordingly.”);
Huemer, supra note 29, at 460 (noting that “[P]eople often think illogically because it is in their
interests to do so. This is particularly common for political beliefs”).
45. See CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 100 (“Holding fast to
beloved opinions increases subjective well-being.”).
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charge,46 making sense of the world,47 or shaping one’s sense of personal
identity.48 Many individuals hold their political beliefs so dearly and so
personally that they equate disagreement with personal attack.49
On the other side of the ledger, for most voters, the cost of holding
erroneous views on political issues approaches zero.50 Because individual
stakeholders have only a single vote, they can assume that their views
will not change the outcome of any political contest.51 Even if their
choices have outcome-determinative effects and are wrong, individual
voters do not experience all of the associated losses, but spread them
diffusely across the entire population.52 Given the difficulties of

46. See id. at 2 (“Protectionist thinking is hard to uproot because it feels good.”) (emphasis in
original).
47. See id. at 16 (“Like the adherents of traditional religion, many people find comfort in their
political worldview, and greet critical questions with pious hostility.”); id. at 116 (“Worldviews are
more a mental security blanket than a serious effort to understand the world. . . .”).
48. See BRENNAN, supra note 29, at 5 (describing a broad group of democratically active
citizens, and emphasizing that “[t]heir political opinions form a part of their identity, and they are
proud to be a member of their political team”); Huemer, supra note 29, at 461 (indicating that
people “prefer to hold the political beliefs that best fit with the images of themselves that they want
to adopt and to project”); see also CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29,
at 14 (“In reality . . . we often have cherished views, valued for their own sake.”); Huemer, supra
note 29, at 460 (explaining that “there are certain things that people want to believe, for reasons
independent of the truth of those propositions or of how well-supported they are by the evidence”).
49. See CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 100 (“In a secular
age, politics and economics have displaced religion itself as the focal point for passionate
conviction and dogmatism . . . When liberals and conservatives quarrel . . . they have emotional
investments in the answer.”); cf. Huemer, supra note 29, at 465 (recognizing that “people accused
of irrationality may take the accusation as a personal attack, rather than as a point relevant to the
political debate, and respond defensively.”).
50. See CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 18 (“In real-world
political settings, the price of ideological loyalty is close to zero.”); Caplan, Rational Irrationality,
supra note 29, at 3 (noting that the private cost of systematic error with respect to political beliefs
is “effectively zero”).
51. The chances that a single vote will change the election approaches zero. See BRENNAN,
supra note 29, at 23 (“The chances that an individual’s vote will make any sort of difference are
vanishingly small.”); CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 5, 131
(noting that “[o]ne vote has so small a probability of affecting electoral outcomes that a realistic
egoist pays no attention to politics . . .” and that “in elections with millions of voters, the probability
that your erroneous policy beliefs cause unwanted policies is approximately zero”); Caplan,
Rational Irrationality, supra note 29, at 3 (noting that “the probability that one vote will change
policy is extremely close to zero”); Winter, supra note 29 (explaining that “each of us separately
has virtually zero influence on the election outcome”); see also Huemer, supra note 29, at 460
(“There is a tiny chance that my belief will have some effect on public policy. . . .”).
52. See CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 14, 121 (noting that
“[w]hen a voter has mistaken beliefs about government policy, the whole population picks up the
tab,” because “errors with drastic real-world repercussions can be cheap for the individual who
makes them” when “most or all of the cost of the mistake falls upon strangers”); Huemer, supra
note 29, at 460 (noting that the costs of irrational beliefs “will be borne by society as a whole; only
a negligible portion of it will be borne by me personally”).
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becoming informed,53 the strength of subjective beliefs,54 the absence of
rewards for making good choices,55 and the low incidence of penalties
for making bad choices,56 voters tend to act irrationally in making choices
on political issues.57 This helps explain the widespread tendency to blame
foreigners for economic woes58 and to favor protectionist measures,59
even though economists of all stripes agree that free trade increases
wealth.60
One might expect politicians and officeholders to behave more
rationally; both have greater access to information, their choices can
determine outcomes, and one might expect them to suffer a greater share
of the losses associated with disastrous political choices. However, while

53. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text (noting that because the cost of becoming
politically informed is so high relative to how little an individual’s vote matters, it is rational to
remain ignorant).
54. See Huemer, supra note 29, at 460 (explaining that “people often think illogically because
it is in their interests to do so,” that “[t]his is particularly common for political beliefs,” and that
“there are certain things that people want to believe, for reasons independent of the truth . . . or of
how well supported they are by the evidence”); see also supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text
(noting that many voters have strongly held beliefs that, while not rooted in fact, shape their sense
of identity).
55. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (observing that voters who spend the time
becoming politically informed and researching candidates are still stuck with whoever the majority
of other people voted for).
56. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text (noting that for most voters, the cost of
holding erroneous views on political issues approaches zero).
57. See CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 133 (“The same
people who practice intellectual self-discipline when they figure out how to commute to work,
repair a car, buy a house, or land a job ‘let themselves go’ when they contemplate the effects of
protectionism, gun control, or pharmaceutical regulation.”); Caplan, Rational Irrationality, supra
note 29, at 9 (“People want to believe what is pleasant, but normally the private costs of acting on
those beliefs deter them from indulging this wish. Nothing comparable deters the consumption of
irrational political beliefs.”); Huemer, supra note 29, at 461 (opining that “since individuals receive
almost none of the benefits from being epistemically rational about political issues, we can predict
that people will often choose to be epistemically irrational about political issues”); see also Caplan,
Rational Irrationality, supra note 29, at 4 (“The institutional structure of politics tends to peg the
price of irrationality at zero. . . . When the price of irrationality is zero, people tend to adhere to
their bliss belief, consuming irrationality until they are ‘satiated.’”); Brennan, supra note 34 (noting
that voters “can afford to indulge silly, false, delusional beliefs—precisely because it costs them
nothing,” and concluding that this encourages voters “to vote expressively, to show their
commitment to their worldview and team”). Of course, there is a group of voters who “think
scientifically and rationally about politics,” but most politically active Americans do not fall within
that group. BRENNAN, supra note 29, at 5–6 (defining and discussing the political behavior of
groups referred to as “hobbits,” “hooligans,” and “vulcans”).
58. CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 16 (acknowledging that
“blaming foreigners for domestic woes is a source of comfort or pride”).
59. Id. at 1.
60. Id.; see also Brennan, supra note 34 (indicating that President Trump’s “anti-trade and antiimmigrant agenda flies against the consensus of economists on the left, right and center”).
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politicians and elected officials are rational actors, 61 securing votes
constitutes their primary goal,62 which they are more likely to achieve by
telling constituents what they want to hear, instead of lecturing them
about flaws in their beliefs and worldviews.63 As a result, politicians tend
to make decisions that indulge the erroneous beliefs of voters, 64 a habit
that one also finds in media coverage for similar reasons.65
Unusually talented politicians do not simply indulge the beliefs and
preferences already held by voters.66 They go even further by trying to
anticipate new sets of beliefs and preferences that voters will want to
hold.67 Thus, after a steep rise in fuel prices, voters are likely to criticize
the greed of oil companies, but unlikely to consider price controls. 68 By
contrast, skilled politicians might attempt to shift the preferences of
voters by suggesting price controls as a brilliant and emotionally61. CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 167 (recognizing that
“[p]oliticians have a[] strong . . . incentive to think rationally about their popularity”); Winter,
supra note 29 (“Politicians are much more rational than us voters.”).
62. See Brennan, supra note 34 (“After all, politicians need to win elections, and to do so, they
have to appeal to voters.”); Winter, supra note 29 (observing that politicians “are governed
primarily by their instinct for political survival”).
63. See CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 37 (quoting ALAN
BLINDER, HARD HEADS, SOFT HEARTS: TOUGH-MINDED ECONOMICS FOR A JUST SOCIETY 111
(1987)) (“Legislators are out to win votes, not intellectual kudos.”); id. at 168 (“If voters are
committed protectionists, politicians do not win their friendship with patient lectures on
comparative advantage.”).
64. See id. at 168 (“Instead of trying to correct popular errors, [politicians] indulge them.”); see
also id. at 19 (emphasizing that “rational choice theory rightly emphasizes that politicians woo
voters by catering to their preferences,” which “means one thing if voters are shrewd policy
consumers, and almost the opposite if . . . voters are like religious devotees”); Winter, supra note
29 (“Our craving for ideology [] means that we like our politicians to be ideologists. . . . Our need
for them to follow an ideology means that they will obey it to appease us.”); Caplan, Rational
Irrationality, supra note 29, at 10 (“Political competition forces each Congressmen to focus solely
on the interests of his constituents.”).
65. See Caplan, Rational Irrationality, supra note 29, at 14 (noting that “[t]he media and
politicians get attention by saying what individual members of the public want to hear, not by
lecturing them about their collective interests,” and explaining that news “makes the front page
because individuals want to read it”); see also BRENNAN, supra note 29, at 43 (“Confirmation bias
explains how we consume news and information. Most people only read news that supports their
preexisting opinions. Left-liberals read The New York Times. Conservatives flock to Fox News.”);
Huemer, supra note 29, at 463 (observing that “[m]ost people choose to listen mainly or solely to
those [news sources] they agree with”).
66. CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 168 (noting that the
shrewd politician goes beyond telling his constituents what they currently want to hear, instead
delivering what they are going to want to hear in the future).
67. Id.; see also J.G, The Irrationality of Politics, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2011),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2011/09/behavioural-economics-0 (indicating that
“politicians are more conversant with human irrationality than most[;] . . . [t]he best politicians are
not the deepest intellects, but those with the intuition to accept human thought and behaviour as it
is, and the skill to shape their ends”) (emphasis added).
68. CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 29, at 168.
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satisfying answer to the crisis.69 Thus, while good politicians indulge the
irrational beliefs of voters, outstanding politicians exacerbate them,70 a
hypothesis that helps explain Donald Trump’s otherwise improbable rise
to the White House on promises to build a wall with Mexico and to enact
a so-called “Muslim ban.”71
As explained in Part III, many stakeholders follow similarly irrational
patterns with respect to their beliefs about the politically charged
phenomenon of ISDS.
III. DEMOCRATIC DYSFUNCTION AND THE EU’S NEW VISION FOR ISDS
Turning to the manifestation of democratic dysfunction in the
69. Id.
70. See id. at 180 (“Unfortunately, it is often more rewarding to exacerbate voter irrationality
than defuse it.”).
71. According to some observers, Trump built his “meteoric rise” to the top of the Republican
presidential ticket on a practice of taking controversial and unprecedented positions to win votes,
including his proposal for a wall on the border with Mexico, which plays on vague connections
among immigration, violent crime, and economic security, and offers an emotionally satisfying
solution to people with strong concerns about that cluster of issues. See Jordan Fabian, Obama:
Trump
Isn’t
a
Populist,
THE
HILL
(June
29,
2016),
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/286037-obama-trump-isnt-a-populist (indicating that
President Obama accused Trump of making controversial statements to win votes, and reporting
that “Trump’s meteoric rise to become the GOP’s standard-bearer was built on a pledge to take
drastic measures to curb illegal immigration, including the construction of a giant wall at the U.S.
southern border at Mexico’s expense”); Francis Wilkinson, Commentary, Trump’s Wall is About
Resentment and Fear, Not Immigration, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Jan. 27, 2017),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-trump-mexico-wall-illegalimmigration-fear-20170127-story.html (noting that Trump began his presidential campaign by
labeling Mexicans “‘rapists,’” asserting that his “political formula [for the wall] is partly dependent
on white resentment and fear of nonwhites,” and concluding that the wall’s “construction provides
endless opportunities both to exaggerate the threat posed by Mexicans, and to supply a remedy
voters can see with their own eyes”). Later, at a campaign rally held on December 7, 2015, Donald
Trump drew an unstated connection between immigration and national security by calling for the
United States to bar all Muslims from entering the country. Patrick Healy & Michael Barbaro,
Trump Wants to Block Entry of All Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, A1 (Dec. 7, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-banningmuslims-from-entering-u-s/. The idea was completely unprecedented for a mainstream presidential
candidate in the United States, but fit Trump’s pattern of making stunning and extreme proposals
to lift his standing in opinion polls. Id. Although the idea was received with derision by members
of the intellectual and political elite across the spectrum, opinion polls indicate that the application
of a partial ban by Executive Order drew more support than opposition. Compare id. (reporting
strongly negative reactions by Gov. Jeb Bush, Sen. Marco Rubio, Secretary Hillary Clinton, as well
as law professors), and Ed Pilkington, Donald Trump: Ban All Muslims Entering US, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/07/donald-trump-banall-muslims-entering-us-san-bernardino-shooting (reporting strongly negative reactions by Gov.
Martin O’Malley, Vice Pres. Dick Cheney, and Sen. Lindsey Graham), with Jonathan Allen, Most
American Voters Support Limited Travel Ban: Poll, REUTERS (July 5, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-poll-idUSKBN19Q2FW (reporting that six in
ten American voters support the recent application of a partial ban, with support rising to 83 percent
among Republicans, and falling to 41 percent among Democrats).
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evolution of TTIP and CETA, one should begin by observing that
investment treaties and ISDS represent tools that allow foreign investors
to challenge the outcomes of the normal political processes in host
states;72 in other words, they allow foreign investors to challenge the
subjective preferences of domestic stakeholders in host states, which by
definition seems unlikely to attract popular support in host states.73
Concerned by the threat that it poses to their political preferences,
stakeholders have articulated narratives that portray investment treaty
arbitration as a menace to the public interest,74 to democracy,75 to

72. See supra note 28 (citing sources explaining that investment treaties and international
arbitration often undermines domestic policy by circumventing democratic processes); see also
Toby Landau Q.C., Response to the Report, Rethinking the Substantive Standards of Protection
Under Investment Treaties, in MIAC 2010: FLAWS AND PRESUMPTIONS: RETHINKING
ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN A NEW ARBITRAL SEAT 367–68 (Dec. 14, 2010) (explaining
that the mandate of arbitrators in investment treaty claims “is to review the exercise of discretion
by a sovereign by way of its executive, its legislative even its judiciary,” which “may well impact
upon a whole community” and “affect the . . . allocation of public funds”).
73. See Rogers, supra note 27, at 258 (indicating that “many commentators seem intent instead
on prioritizing States’ ability to have their policy decisions and activities unhampered by
international investment law”).
74. See, e.g., Lise Johnson et al., Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest and U.S.
Domestic Law, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE DEV. POL’Y PAPER, at 1 (May 2015)
(“Multinational companies are increasingly using ISDS to challenge the legal and regulatory
systems and policy choices of the contracting states, posing a serious and growing risk to the ability
of states to govern in the public interest.”); Vera Korzun, The Right to Regulate in Investor-State
Arbitration: Slicing and Dicing Regulatory Carve-Outs, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 355, 406–07
(2017) (“Multinational corporations have acquired, through ISDS, an unprecedented opportunity
to interfere with a government’s ability to regulate for the public interest, encroaching on a core
feature of state sovereignty.”).
75. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT: ONLINE PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON
INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND INVESTOR-TO-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS) IN THE
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (TTIP) 14, SWD (2015) 3
final (Jan. 13, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf
[hereinafter Online Public Consultation] (discussing 145,686 responses to a public consultation
and noting that most respondents perceive ISDS as a “threat to democracy”); DAVID
SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND
DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE 225 (2008) (arguing that the protection offered to foreign investors under
international investment law “destabilize[s] the functioning of democratic processes”); James
Surowiecki, Trade-Agreement Troubles, THE NEW YORKER: THE FINANCIAL PAGE (June 22,
2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/22/trade-agreement-troubles (“However
you spin it, it’s an infringement on the democratic process.”), see also José E. Alvarez, Is the TransPacific Partnership’s Investment Chapter the New “Gold Standard?,” 47 VICTORIA U.
WELLINGTON L. REV. 503, 507 (2016) (“To critics, ISDS is the poster child for bypassing the
principal mechanism that democracies have for checking the power of their executive branches:
namely administrative or constitutional courts.”); PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT
REGIME,
OSGOODE
HALL
L.
SCH.
(Aug.
31,
2010),
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement-international-investment-regime-31-august-2010
(describing “[t]he award of damages as a remedy of first resort in investment arbitration” as “a
serious threat to democratic choice”).
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sovereignty,76 and even to the constitutional order in host states.77
Despite scholarship indicating that host states prevail more often than
they lose in investment treaty arbitrations,78 that damage awards tend to
be relatively low,79 and that no state has ever incurred liability for the
adoption or application of bona fide environmental regulations,80
76. See, e.g., Ryan Cooper, How the TPP Boosts Corporate Power at the Expense of National
Sovereignty, THE WEEK (Oct. 7, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/581609/how-tpp-boostscorporate-power-expense-national-sovereignty (discussing several “dubious” provisions of the
proposed TPP agreement, specifically noting that TPP undermines national sovereignty); Owen
Jones, Opinion, The TTIP Deal Hands British Sovereignty to Multinationals, THE GUARDIAN (Sept.
14,
2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/14/ttip-deal-britishsovereignty-cameron-ukip-treaty (emphasizing the corrosion of British sovereignty due to
multinational dispute resolution); Steve Shaff, Op-Ed, Small Businesses’ Fast Track to Ruin, THE
BALTIMORE SUN (June 2, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-tpp20150602-story.html (asserting that ISDS “represents a major threat to our sovereignty”); Elizabeth
Warren, Opinion, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose, WASH. POST
(Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlement-languagein-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274e5209a3bc9a9_story.html?utm_term=.b6ecbde74d4b (warning that TPP will only benefit the
largest multinational corporations, while simultaneously undermining U.S. sovereignty); see also
Letter from Legal Scholars to Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, Minority Leader Harry Reid,
Speaker John Boehner, Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, and Ambassador Michael Froman (2015),
https://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ISDS-Letter-3.11.pdf (warning that ISDS
“threatens domestic sovereignty”).
77. See Bill Moyers Reports: Trading Democracy (PBS television broadcast Feb. 5, 2002)
(describing NAFTA’s investment chapter as an “end-run around the Constitution”), selected clips
and transcripts available at http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/tradingdemocracy.html.
78. See UNCTAD WIR 2017, supra note 26, at 117 (indicating that 495 investment treaty
arbitrations had been concluded by the end of 2016, with states winning completely in 36 percent
of the cases, investors prevailing at least in part in 27 percent of the cases, and the parties settling
in about 25 percent of the cases); Susan D. Franck & Lindsey Wylie, Predicting Outcomes in
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 65 DUKE L.J. 459, 481, 489–90 (2015) (analyzing investment treaty
awards publicly available as of January 1, 2012, and concluding that investors prevailed—meaning
that they received some award of damages—in 39.6 percent of cases that did not settle, and that
states prevailed—meaning that they were not ordered to pay some damages—in 60.4 percent of
cases that did not settle).
79. See UNCTAD WIR 2017, supra note 26, at 118 (indicating that the median amount claimed
by investors was $100 million and that the median amount awarded on successful claims was $20
million); Franck & Wylie, supra note 78, at 488, 495 (indicating that the median amount claimed
by investors was $100,426,693, that the median amount awarded on successful claims was $10.9
million, and that successful investors received a median 27 percent of requested damages). Average
numbers would be much higher (but less representative than) medians, inasmuch as one tribunal
awarded $50 billion in Yukos-related claims against Russia, with the result that the massive
statistical outlier tremendously skews average amounts claimed and recovered. See id. at 478
(indicating that one tribunal awarded $50 billion in damages against Russia as a result of claims
relating to the dissolution of Yukos Oil); see also UNCTAD WIR 2017, supra note 26, at 118
(indicating that the average amount claimed by investors was $1.4 billion, and the average amount
awarded on successful claims was $545 million).
80. See Hon. Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth About
Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 728 (2014) (“In no case has a state been ordered to compensate an investor
for enacting a generally applicable environmental law or legitimately enforcing a generally
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opposition to investment treaty arbitration in its present form continues

applicable environmental law or legitimately enforcing an environmental regulation that caused an
investor a loss.”); see also 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Annex B, ¶ 4(b), at 38,
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf (“Except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate
public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute
indirect expropriations.”); Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto, Environmental and Health Regulation:
Assessing Liability Under Investment Treaties, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 37 (2011) (opining that
“it is hard to conceive of a situation in which a tribunal would award compensation for a taking
resulting from a non-discriminatory, legitimate environmental or health regulation,” and that
“[s]everal investment treaties make this point expressly”). The imposition of liability for the
adoption or application of ostensibly environmental measures seems more likely where those
measures are not legitimate in the sense that they lack a scientific basis, violate fairly specific
commitments made by the host state, or involve some combination of both deficiencies. See Moloo
& Jacinto, supra, at 25, 33 (discussing the appropriateness of compensating environmental takings
claims). When such factors are present, it may also be relevant that sub-national authorities have
relied on legally irrelevant considerations in applying measures relating to investors and their
investments. See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶¶ 32–36,
40–41, 50–52, 78–93 (Aug. 30, 2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0510.pdf (involving a situation where Mexican federal authorities repeatedly told an
investor that it had all the permits required to operate a hazardous waste facility, but where
municipal authorities denied the investor a construction permit without citing any construction
defects and apparently relied on local opposition and environmental concerns, which were legally
irrelevant to the exercise of powers falling within the scope of municipal jurisdiction); see also
Moloo & Jacinto, supra, at 56 (noting that adherence to a “state’s typical practice is also significant
as an anomalous measure may indicate that the state was motivated by [improper] purposes”).
In his contribution to this volume, David Schneiderman refers to Clayton/Bilcon v. Canada, PCA
Case No. 2009–04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (Mar. 17, 2015), as an “extraordinary”
decision in which the tribunal imposed liability for what was at most “arguably a breach of host
state law.” See David Schneiderman, International Investment Law’s Unending Legitimation
Project, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 229, 267 (2017); see also Clayton/Bilcon, No. 2009–04, Dissenting
Opinion of Donald McRae, ¶ 34 (“At most, then, the majority is saying that there has been a
violation of Article 1105 because of a potential violation of Canadian law. . . .”). During discussion
of the author’s remarks at the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal symposium, Professor
Schneiderman expressed the view that Clayton/Bilcon provides one example of an investment
treaty case in which the tribunal imposed liability based on the application of a legitimate
environmental measure. Admittedly, the case falls closer to his description than most, and it is
possible that reasonable people could agree with Schneiderman’s assessment (as evidenced by
Donald McRae’s dissenting opinion). See Clayton/Bilcon, No. 2009–04, Dissenting Opinion of
Donald McRae, at ¶¶ 38, 51 (asserting that the Joint Review Panel took a “principled position” on
Canadian law even though it put “more weight on the human environment and on community
values than on scientific and technical feasibility”). Nevertheless, the author regards Clayton/Bilcon
as more on point with Metalclad inasmuch as the majority in Clayton/Bilcon emphasized a “highly
unusual” constellation of factual elements that closely resembled the ones at play in Metalclad,
namely: specific representations of support for the project by officials at higher levels of
government, reliance by the investor on those representations, the lack of a scientific basis for the
challenged measure, and the weight that lower-level decisionmakers assigned to local opposition
under the rubric of “community core values,” a concept that the tribunal regarded as lacking
specificity or any grounding in applicable “statutes, regulations, or . . . [g]uidelines.” See
Clayton/Bilcon, No. 2009–04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, supra, at ¶¶ 447–53, 463, 466–
72, 477–87, 492, 503–14, 520–47, 552–55, 583, 589–92, 601, 603–04, 739–40.
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to build,81 often with the unshakable zeal of religious conviction.82
For example, a public consultation conducted by the EU in 2014
regarding TTIP, and investor-state arbitration as a part of TTIP, generated
nearly 150,000 written responses, literally overwhelming the EU’s
computer servers and registering widespread opposition to its inclusion
in the treaty.83 Subsequently, in fall 2015, hundreds of thousands of
people took to the streets of Berlin and other German cities to
demonstrate the strength of their opposition to investor-state arbitration
as a part of TTIP.84 Contemporaneously, over three million people signed
an online petition calling on the EU to abandon negotiations for TTIP. 85
Not surprisingly, news outlets have reinforced the concerns of
81. See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015: REFORMING INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE xi (2015), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf
[hereinafter UNCTAD WIR 2015] (referring to the “heated public debate” about investment treaties
and ISDS “in many countries and regions,” and concluding that “[t]here is a pressing need for
systematic reform of the global IIA regime”) (emphasis in original); Barry Appleton & Sean
Stephenson, Initial Task Force Discussion Paper: Executive Summary & Conclusions and
Recommendations, Inv. Treaty Working Group of the Int’l Arb. Comm., A.B.A. SEC. ON INT’L L.
6 (Oct. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Executive Summary of Task Force Discussion Paper] (“Public enmity
to the investor-state process is widespread and rather than abating, it continues to grow,
demonstrating impact on electoral politics in the Parties to investment protection treaties such as
the members of the EU and the United States.”); Schneiderman, supra note 80, at 232 (describing
a “proliferation of complaints, channeled by media representations that cast doubt on the legitimacy
of ISDS or states and sub-regional units expressing doubt about the utility of ISDS”); Dalibor
Rohac, Friends of Free Trade Need to Stand Up and Fight, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INST. (Oct.
21, 2016), http://www.aei.org/publication/friends-of-free-trade-need-to-stand-up-and-fight (noting
that “both the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) . . . and the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) . . . are facing a massive popular backlash across
Europe”).
82. See Nikos Lavranos, Countering Anti-ISDS Propaganda with Facts: An Uphill Battle,
WOLTERS
KLUWER:
KLUWER
ARB.
BLOG
(June
8,
2015),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/06/08/countering-anti-isds-propaganda-with-facts-anuphill-battle (indicating “that most, if not all, anti-ISDS criticisms are neither supported by facts
nor experience from investment arbitration law and practice”); Rohac, supra note 81 (“What makes
the current situation disturbing is the one-sided and post-factual nature of the conversation. In a
way that is highly reminiscent of Russian propaganda . . . the anti-TTIP and anti-CETA activists
are extremely casual with facts.”).
83. Online Public Consultation, supra note 75, at 2–3, 8–10, 14 (summarizing several main
objectives and considerations of the online consultation regarding TTIP).
84. See Imogen Calderwood, ‘No to TTIP!’ 150,000 Protesters Fill Streets of Berlin to
Demonstrate Against Controversial Europe-US Trade Deal That Would Give Corporations the
Right to Sue Governments in Secret Courts, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 10, 2015),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3267936/No-TTIP-150-000-protesters-streets-Berlindemonstrate-against-controversial-Europe-trade-deal.html (highlighting widespread public protest
of TTIP); Chris Johnston, Berlin Anti-TTIP Trade Deal Protest Attracts Hundreds of Thousands,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/10/berlin-anti-ttiptrade-deal-rally-hundreds-thousands-protesters (discussing the public denouncement of TTIP in
Berlin and emphasizing the several hundred thousand protestors).
85. See Johnston, supra note 84 (noting that three million people signed an online petition
calling on the European Commission to abandon TTIP).
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stakeholders by regularly publishing content likely to feed or to validate
their anxiety about investment treaties and investor-state arbitration.86
While states have responded to public concerns by introducing
substantial refinements to their model investment treaties over the past
ten to fifteen years,87 talented politicians on both sides of the Atlantic got
out in front of stakeholders in late 2015 and early 2016. On this side of
the Atlantic, the leading candidates in the U.S. presidential election
addressed concerns about trade and investment agreements not by
proposing incremental refinements, but by opposing ratification of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership in any form,88 despite several years of
86. See, e.g., Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The Arbitration Game, THE ECONOMIST (Oct.
11, 2014) http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756-governments-aresouring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration (depicting investor-state arbitration as “a way
to let multinational companies get rich at the expense of ordinary people,” including by mounting
challenges to laws that “discourage smoking, protect the environment or prevent nuclear
catastrophe”); see also Manuel Pérez-Rocha, Op-Ed, When Corporations Sue Governments, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/opinion/when-corporations-suegovernments.html (accusing corporations of using investment treaties “to bring opportunistic cases
in arbitral courts,” where the proceedings resemble “soccer on half the field[:] [c]orporations are
free to sue, and nations must defend themselves at enormous cost—and the best a government can
hope for is a scoreless game”); Claire Provost & Matt Kennard, The Obscure Legal System That
Lets
Corporations
Sue
Countries,
THE
GUARDIAN
(June
10,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-lets-corportations-suestates-ttip-icsid (warning that “the massive financial risks associated with investor-state arbitration
will effectively grant foreign investors a veto over government decisions”); Surowiecki, supra note
75, at 26 (arguing that ISDS makes free trade “look like exactly what people fear—a system
designed to put corporate interests above public ones”).
87. See José E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 223, 235, 237–38 (2011)
(describing how the “2004 U.S. Model BIT . . . shrunk . . . virtually every right originally accorded
to foreign investors while at the same time increasing . . . the discretion accorded host states,” and
explaining how this development influenced treaty practice in other states); see also UNCTAD
WIR 2015, supra note 81, at 124 (indicating that “several countries have embarked on a path of
[International Investment Agreement] reform by revising their [bilateral investment treaty] models”
as a result of “[m]ounting criticism from civil society”); Charles H. Brower II, Corporations as
Plaintiffs Under International Law: Three Narratives About Investment Treaties, 9 SANTA CLARA
J. INT’L L. 179, 192–96 (2011) (discussing the recalibration of investment treaty practice by the
United States, Canada, Norway, and other states in a manner designed to reduce the jurisprudential
discretion of tribunals and to increase the regulatory discretion of states); Anthea Roberts, Clash
of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L.
45, 78 (2013) (“While the first generation of investment treaties was characterized by a
considerable shift of interpretive power from the treaty parties to investment tribunals, the newly
emerging second generation will be characterized by states seeking to recalibrate this balance of
power by increasing the specificity of their treaty commitments and reasserting their interpretive
rights as treaty parties.”).
88. See Brower, supra note 25, at 145 (discussing Hillary R. Clinton’s and Donald J. Trump’s
mutual opposition to TPP); Jeffrey Rothfeder, Why Obama Is Still Trying to Pass the T.P.P., THE
NEW YORKER (Sept. 18, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why-obama-is-stilltrying-to-pass-the-t-p-p (reporting that Donald Trump vowed to “keep America out of the TransPacific Partnership,” that Bernie Sanders “hates it with a passion,” and that Hillary Clinton switched
from a supporter to an opponent of the TPP).
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negotiations,89 a final text that conformed to recent U.S. treaty practice,90
and a package of undertakings designed to advance the geostrategic
interests of the United States along the Pacific Rim.91 On the other side
of the Atlantic, the EU used TTIP negotiations to propose abolition of
investor-state arbitration and its replacement with a permanent
investment court.92 Contemporaneously, the EU also forced the lastminute introduction of provisions on an investment court into the already
final version of its CETA agreement with Canada.93 Thus, even though
the United States’ retreat from multilateral trade and investment
agreements has killed the prospects for TTIP,94 the point is that the EU
89. See Don Lee, Signing of Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deal Opens Up Tough Battle in
U.S., L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-pacific-trade-agreementsigned-20160204-story.html (indicating that the TPP was concluded after more than five years of
negotiations); Rothfeder, supra note 88 (indicating that the Obama administration devoted five
years to the negotiations).
90. Brower, supra note 25, at 189–90 (noting that knowledgeable commentators described the
investment chapter provisions of TPP as continuing well-established U.S. treaty practice).
91. Id. at 209–14.
92. See European Union, Commission Proposal for Investment Protection and Resolution of
Investment Disputes, at § 3, sub sec. 4, arts. 9–12, (Nov. 15, 2015)
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf [EU’s TTIP Draft on
Investment] (outlining the Investment Court System); Alvarez, supra note 75, at 512 (explaining
that “the European Union recently tabled a proposal that would, among other things, replace ISDS
in the TTIP with an international investment court with judges appointed for up to 12 years and a
process for appeals”); Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of
the United States Relating to International Law: United States and Eleven Other Nations Conclude
Trans-Pacific Partnership, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 384, 388 (2016) (observing that the “European
Union now aims to eliminate traditional ISDS from the TTIP and replace it with an ‘investment
court’”); Laird, supra note 3, at 108 (discussing the EU’s proposal “to include in TTIP a purported
court-based model that seeks to repudiate the arbitration model”).
93. See Susan D. Franck et al., Inside the Arbitrator’s Mind, 66 EMORY L.J. 1115, 1119 n.17
(2017) (explaining that the “original, signed version of CETA included arbitration; but in an
unprecedented ‘scrubbing’ process, arbitration was replaced wholesale with a standing court”);
James Gathii & Cynthia Ho, Regime Shifting of IP Lawmaking and Enforcement From the WTO to
the International Investment Regime, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 427, 500–01 (2017) (noting that
that the EU “managed to recently incorporate such provisions in the investment chapter of CETA
two years after the agreement had already been concluded[;] [t]echnically, the EU was simply
scrubbing the document, but it added substantial changes, including a permanent investment
tribunal, as well as an appellate tribunal”) (emphasis original).
94. Jim Zarroli, German Official Says U.S.-Europe Trade Talks Have Collapsed, Blames
Washington,
NPR
(Aug.
28,
2016),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/08/28/491721332/german-official-says-u-s-europe-trade-talks-have-collapsed-blameswashington (“Talks aimed at setting up a U.S.-European free trade zone have run aground because
of intransigence on Washington’s part, a top German politician said Sunday.”); see also Michelle
Chen, Another Free-Trade Deal Bites the Dust, THE NATION (Sept. 16, 2016),
https://www.thenation.com/article/another-free-trade-deal-bites-the-dust (explaining that while the
“presidential campaign trail has been awash in angry backlash against the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP),” the TTIP “collapsed silently on the other side of the globe”); Hard Bargain: Lacking Clear
American Leadership, the Global Trade Agenda is Floundering, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 1, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21707940-lacking-clear-american-
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has used the idea of an investment court to get out in front of stakeholders,
has used CETA to establish a toe-hold for that vision,95 and remains
committed to embedding that vision in its treaty practice.96
IV. THE NEED FOR CAUTION WHEN APPROACHING REVOLUTIONARY
CHANGE
Turning to the need for caution in assessing TTIP’s model for an
investment court, one should begin by observing that the EU draft
nominally offers investors their choice of arbitration under the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)
Convention, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, or the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Arbitration
Rules.97 However, the text also contemplates that proceedings will be
conducted by a permanent Tribunal of First Instance consisting of five
judges from the EU, five from the other state party, and five from third
leadership-global-trade-agenda-floundering-hard (noting that TTIP negotiations are “flailing,” and
quoting a EU official as saying that “there will be a natural pause” if negotiations were not
completed before the U.S. presidential election, and predicting that a “revival would not be
imminent”).
95. James Crawford, The Ideal Arbitrator: Does One Size Fit All?, 32 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
1003, 1018 (2017) (indicating that the EU intended TTIP to represent the “lodestar” for its
investment court proposal, and that negotiations for the TTIP are “de facto dead,” but that the
investment court proposal remains in play because the European Commission is introducing facets
of that proposal in other free-trade agreements, including CETA).
96. See id. (explaining that following the de facto demise of TTIP negotiations, the European
Commission has been introducing elements of its investment court proposal into other free-trade
agreements “as stepping-stones towards the establishment of a permanent multilateral investment
court”); Geoffrey Gertz, Renegotiating NAFTA: Options for Investment Protection, GLOBAL
VIEWS, 1, 7 (2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/global-20170315nafta.pdf (reporting that following inclusion of the proposed investment court in CETA, Canada
and the EU have “publicly advocated for this court and are actively seeking to recruit new
members”); Schill, supra note 3 (indicating that the EU’s investment court proposal “serves as a
basis for negotiations not only with the U.S., but also with any of the EU’s negotiating partners”).
97. EU’s TTIP Draft on Investment, supra note 92, at § 3(3), art. 6(2). The ICSID Convention
means the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (1966), which establishes a treaty-based regime associated with the
World Bank for arbitration of investment disputes between a state party and the nationals of another
state party. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 25, at 238–39. The ICSID Additional Facility Rules
establish a non-treaty-based facility for arbitrating investment disputes between a state and the
nationals of another state where only one of the states has ratified the ICSID Convention. See ICSID
Arbitration
(Additional
Facility)
Rules
(2006),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/AFR_English-final.pdf;
DOLZER
&
SCHREUER, supra note 25, at 241–42. The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules means the set of
arbitration rules drafted and adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, and are regularly used in the contexts of international commercial arbitration and investment
treaty
arbitration.
See
UNCITRAL
Arbitration
Rules
(2010),
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010e.pdf; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 25, at 243.

2017]

Trajectory of Investor-State Dispute Settlement

293

states, who will sit in evenly distributed three-member divisions.98 In
addition, the text establishes a six-member Appeals Body, with two
members from the EU, two from the other state party, and two from third
states, sitting in equally distributed, three-member divisions.99 At both
levels, members are appointed by governments to six-year terms with the
possibility of a single renewal.100
Internally, the EU’s vision for an investment court may face
difficulties associated with Byzantine requirements for approval of the
EU’s trade and investment agreements.101 Externally, however, the EU’s
vision for an investment court seems potentially unstoppable because it
faces no strong centers of opposition. While the United States had resisted
98.
99.
100.
101.

EU’s TTIP Draft on Investment, supra note 92, § 3(4), art. 9.
Id., § 3(4), art. 10.
Id., § 3(4), arts. 9(2), 9(5), 10(3), 10(5).
See Jennifer Rankin, Belgian Politicians Drop Opposition to EU-Canada Trade Deal, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/27/belgium-reachesdeal-with-wallonia-over-eu-canada-trade-agreement (indicating that the “EU requires all 28
member states to support CETA for the treaty to come into force, but [that] the Belgian federal
government, which has always backed the trade treaty, was barred from giving its consent because
of opposition from regional parliaments in Wallonia and Brussels”). The Belgian government
announced that Wallonia dropped its opposition to CETA as of October 27, 2016. Id. That paved
the way for signature of the agreement on October 30, 2016, and approval by the EU Parliament
on February 15, 2017. See Developments in Brief, 59 NO. (8) GOV’T CONTRACTOR, ¶ 54(a) (Mar.
1, 2017). During May 2017, a bill to approve CETA’s implementation passed the Canadian Senate
and received royal assent. Int’l Ctr. For Trade & Sustainable Dev., Canadian Senate Approves
CETA
Implementation
Bill,
21
BRIDGES
1,
16
(May
18,
2017),
https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/bridgesweekly21-17d.pdf. While that establishes the
conditions required for provisional application of CETA, the agreement’s provisions on investment
protection and the investment court system will not be in force during the provisional phase and
will not be applied until the parliaments of all twenty-eight EU member states approve CETA in
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. Developments in Brief, supra, ¶ 54(a).
On May 16, 2017, the European Court of Justice rendered an opinion in which it held that the
European Union has exclusive competence to enter into treaties with third states with respect to
protection of foreign direct investment, but that the European Union and member states possess
shared competence for treaties with third states with respect to other types of investment (such as
portfolio investment), as well as investor-state dispute settlement for claims brought against
member states, inasmuch as it displaces the normal competence of national courts to hear claims
against member states. Case C-2/15, Judgment of May 16, 2017, ¶¶ 109–10, 238, 243–44, 286,
292–93,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=193125&pageIndex=0&doclan
g=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=414101. This means that, as a matter of EU law,
agreements like CETA, TTIP, and the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement require ratification by
all twenty-eight EU member states. Some observers have questioned whether the requirement for
approval by all twenty-eight member states (including states that require approval by regional
bodies as a part of their internal law) “might . . . spell the end of the EU’s fledgling project to
promote a new generation of trade and investment agreements and an international investment court
system.” See Leng Sun Chan SC & Edward Poulton, EU Court Thwarts Prompt ratification of EUSingapore Free Trade Agreement, BAKER MCKENZIE INSIGHT, (May 22, 2017),
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2017/05/eu-court-thwarts-promptratification/.
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the proposed investment court in negotiations for TTIP,102 its recent
withdrawal from multilateral negotiations on trade and investment
agreements means the disappearance of the only external stakeholder
with the leverage and the desire to frustrate European goals. As a result,
the EU can focus on negotiations with more pliable states, 103 thereby
establishing a critical mass of treaties embracing the EU’s vision and
obligating the other states’ parties to pursue the same vision in their own
treaty practices,104 which could shift global expectations about the
prospects for an investment court.105
102. See Krista Hughes & Philip Blenkinsop, U.S. Wary of EU Proposal for Investment Court
in Trade Pact, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-ttipidUSKCN0SN2LH20151029 (stating “[t]he United States is wary of a European Union proposal
for a new court system to settle investment disputes as part of the world’s biggest free-trade
agreement, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman said”); see also Investor-State Dispute
Settlement:
Playing
Nicely,
THE
ECONOMIST
(May
9,
2015),
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21650592-europe-suggests-waysprotect-governments-investors-playing-nicely (noting that in the context of TTIP negotiations
“America wants investing firms to have the right to haul states off to binding arbitration”).
103. In addition to the CETA agreement with Canada, the EU has completed negotiations
relating to a free trade agreement with Vietnam, which also contains an investment chapter
contemplating the establishment of a permanent investment court. European Commission, EUVietnam Free Trade Agreement: Agreed Text as of January 2016, ch. 8(II), § 3(4), arts. 12–13 (Jan.
20, 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154210.pdf [hereinafter EUVietnam FTA]. The EU has also conducted four rounds of negotiations with Myanmar relating to
an agreement on the protection of foreign investment, during the most recent of which the EU
presented its proposal on an investment court system. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE
FOURTH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE EU-MYANMAR INVESTMENT PROTECTION
AGREEMENT
(Dec.
22,
2016),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/december/tradoc_155197.pdf.
104. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-EU., art 8.29, Oct. 30, 2016,
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agracc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng (obliging the parties to “pursue with other trading
partners the establishment of a multilateral investment tribunal and appellate mechanism for the
resolution of investment disputes”); EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 103, art. 15 (obliging the parties
to “enter into negotiations for an international agreement providing for a multilateral investment
tribunal in combination with, or separate from, a multilateral appellate mechanism applicable to
disputes under this Agreement”).
105. See Laird, supra note 3, at 121 (indicating that the underlying objective of the EU’s
proposal may be the establishment of “a de facto international legal system”). On July 6, 2017, the
EU and Japan reached “an agreement in principle on the main elements of the EU-Japan Economic
Partnership Agreement.” However, while the EU placed its proposal for a permanent investment
court on the table and has taken the position that “there can be no return to the old-style Investor to
State Dispute Settlement System (ISDS),” those topics remain outside the agreement in principle
between the EU and Japan. See Press Release, European Commission, EU and Japan Reach
Agreement in Principle on Economic Partnership Agreement (July 6, 2017),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1686 (indicating that some topics lie outside
the agreement in principle, identifying investment protection as an example, and mentioning that
the EU had placed on the table its proposal for an investment court system); Memorandum from
European Commission, Key Elements of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (July 6,
2017), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1687 (indicating that “the EU has
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Large multinational investors may not like the EU’s vision, but seem
unlikely to oppose it, in part because investment treaties do not rank high
on their list of institutional concerns,106 and in part because multinational
enterprises have other options in managing disputes with host states.107
Small- and medium-size investors might oppose the EU’s proposal for an
investment court, but lack the political capital to influence treaty
negotiations.108 Under these circumstances, conditions arguably favor the
tabled to Japan its reformed proposal on the Investment Court System,” and that “[f]or the EU, it
is clear that there can be no return to the old-style Investor to State Dispute Settlement System
(ISDS)”). Just as the last-minute introduction of the investment court system into CETA seemed
calculated to influence TTIP negotiations, it seems plausible that the extension of the investment
court system to the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement and the negotiations with Myanmar may
be calculated to influence negotiations with Japan, which—if successful—would shift global
expectations about the prospects for an investment court.
106. It is, of course, difficult to quantify the institutional concerns of multinational corporations
in a general way. Anecdotally, at conferences involving in-house counsel from multinational
corporations, the author has heard the proposition that investment treaties would not get attention
at the CEO level, but might get attention at the general-counsel level. Somewhat less anecdotally,
one might refer to the current list of policy priorities and the most recent list of policy
accomplishments of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as rough proxies for the topics that will get,
and have gotten, the most energy from multinational corporations, inasmuch as most large
multinationals are members of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and contribute generously to its
advocacy work. See The Chamber of Secrets, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 21, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21553020 (indicating that most Fortune 1,000 companies are
members of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and contribute “generous sums” to that organization).
For 2017, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has a thirty-two-page compilation of twenty-three policy
priorities. International Trade, Investment, and Regulatory Policy (much broader than investment
treaties) makes the list, but ranks well behind (1) Capital Markers, Corporate Governance and
Securities Regulation, (2) Energy and the Environment, (3) Health Care, (4) National Security and
Emergency Preparedness, (5) Pensions, and (6) Regulatory Affairs in terms of textual coverage.
See U.S. Chamber of Commerce: U.S. Chamber Policy Priorities for 2017,
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/2017_policy_priorities_-_2.8.17.pdf. (last visited
Nov. 13, 2017). For 2016, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has a forty-five-page list of policy
accomplishments in twenty-four areas. International Trade, Investment, and Regulatory Policy
makes the list but, if one eliminates a long list of country-specific actions, it ranks well behind (1)
Capital Markers, Corporate Governance and Securities Regulation, (2) Energy and the
Environment, (3) Immigration and Travel, (4) Intellectual Property, (5) Labor, (6) Legal Reform,
(7) National Security and Emergency Preparedness, and (8) Regulatory Affairs in terms of textual
coverage. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Policy Accomplishments JanuaryDecember 2016, https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/2016_policy_accomplishments__final_1.17.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2017). Somewhat more empirically, certain studies indicate
that investors generally do not take investment treaties into consideration when making foreign
investments, which suggests that other topics rank higher for multinational corporations even when
making foreign investments. See Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, The Importance of BITs for Foreign
Direct Investment and Political Risk Insurance: Revisiting the Evidence, in YEARBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2009–2010 539, 543 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010)
(stating “[f]or the vast majority of investors, BITs do not appear to be important—directly or
indirectly—when determining where, and how much, to invest abroad”).
107. See infra notes 120–22 and accompanying text.
108. As noted below, small- and medium-size investors generally lack the clout to negotiate
strong contractual guarantees regarding investment protection with host states. See infra note 123
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EU’s vision for a permanent investment court.
Perhaps for this reason, one senses a Field of Dreams mentality around
the proposed investment court: Build it and they will come.109 Here one
needs to sound the first note of caution. Many investors would come only
kicking and screaming. In a departure from decades of treaty practice,
they would lose the opportunity to have any voice in the appointment of
tribunal members.110 Instead, governments would appoint all panelists,
who seem likely to reflect the (possibly irrational) sensibilities of elected
officials and stakeholders in the relevant states.111 The realities of
political appointments mean that the pool of judges likely will not
coincide with any list of the most experienced arbitrators, or investment
arbitrators, or international lawyers from any jurisdiction.112 The
and accompanying text. It stands to reason that they would similarly lack the clout to drive treaty
negotiations that would have significantly wider reaching effects for host states.
109. See Theo Merz, Ten Film Quotes We All Get Wrong, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 14, 2014),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/men/the-filter/10553934/Ten-film-quotes-we-all-get-wrong.html
(identifying this as a common error in quoting the voice that Kevin Costner’s character repeatedly
hears in the movie, Field of Dreams, and indicating that while most people remember the phrase
“build it and they will come,” the voice actually says “build it and he will come”).
110. See Crawford, supra note 95, at 1019–20; Laird, supra note 3, at 120.
111. See Crawford, supra note 95, at 1020 (expressing the opinion that the EU, United States,
and Canada are “more cautious to exercise control over the type of decision-maker appointed and
have unsurprisingly mandated the selection of arbitrators with qualities and qualifications that the
States know and trust”); Alison Ross, The End of the “Great Compact?” Reisman Declares
Investment Law at a Crossroads, GLOBAL ARBITRATION REVIEW (Feb. 16, 2017),
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1081449/the-end-of-the-great-compact”-reismandeclares-investment-law-at-a-crossroads (reporting that Professor Michael Reisman “expressed
unease at the counter-strategy of attempting to ‘capture the tribunal’ [by having an investment court
all of whose members are appointed by states and possibly beholden to them]”); see also Executive
Summary of Task Force Discussion Paper, supra note 81, at 14 (noting that “commentators have
raised concerns that the selection of judges will be carried out in a political fashion and carries the
risk of the treaty parties appointing individuals who, whilst independent, are more likely to be
sympathetic to the interests of State Respondents”); European Union’s Proposed Investment Court
Chapter for TTIP: Towards the End of Investment Treaties as We Know Them? ALLEN & OVERY
(Nov.
26,
2015),
http://www.allenovery.com/publications/engb/Pages/European%20Union’s%20Proposed%20Investment%20Chapter%20for%20TTIP%20T
owards%20the%20End%20of%20Investment%20Treaties%20as%20We%20Know%20Them.as
px (explaining that the “fear of the investor community has been that an ‘investment court’ would
represent state interests to their detriment”).
112. See Laird, supra note 3, at 120 (opining that “the experience in ICSID with government
appointments to the ICSID list is not encouraging[;] [w]e see many of the arbitrators on that list
have no actual experience in ICSID arbitration and were appointed ostensibly because of political
considerations”); see also Charles N. Brower & Charles B. Rosenberg, The Death of the TwoHeaded Nightingale: Why the Paulsson-van den Berg Presumption that Party-Appointed
Arbitrators Are Untrustworthy is Wrongheaded, 6 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 619, 646
(2012) (observing that politicization of “the appointment process militates against the appointment
of uniformly high-quality professional arbitrators”); Crawford, supra note 95, at 1020–21
(predicting that the appointment criteria for the EU’s proposed investment court “will exclude a
proportion of investment arbitrators from consideration,” including “the Grand Old Men, the
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possibility for a second term means that tribunal members may initially
conduct themselves to maximize chances for reappointment,113 by which
time they will have locked themselves into positions on recurring issues.
Finally, the need for one of the two members from third countries to
preside in every case before the appeals body means that just two
individuals will have a tremendous influence over the development of
international investment law for twelve years at a time.114 Investors seem
Technocrats, and the Managers”); Rogers, supra note 27, at 251 (observing that those “who
advocate for a permanent investment court seem to assume that judges would be drawn from
something other than the pool of existing investment arbitrators”). Judge Stephen Schwebel has
also questioned whether the modest compensation structure envisioned for members of the
investment court was intended to discourage, rather than to encourage, consideration of experienced
arbitrators in the appointment process. Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, The Proposals of the European
Commission for Investment Protection and an Investment Court System (May 17, 2016),
http://isdsblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/2/2016/05/THEPROPOSALSOFTHEEUROPEANCOMMISSION.pdf
(transcript of remarks given at Sidley Austin in Washington, D.C.).
113. See Laird, supra note 3, at 120 (noting that “judges may make decisions to curry favor with
those who appointed them (and will reappoint them)”); Jonathan Klett, National Interest vs.
Foreign Investment: Protecting Parties Through ISDS, 25 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 213, 231–32
(2016) (observing that judges “may lack independence if they are seeking reappointment” to the
investment court); Robert W. Schwieder, TTIP and the Investment Court System: A New (and
Improved?) Paradigm for Investor-State Adjudication, 55 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 178, 203
(2016) (indicating that “judges that are up for reappointment will have an incentive to act in
accordance with [the] expectations [of appointing states] in order to secure their employment
position”); Executive Summary of Task Force Discussion Paper, supra note 81, at 14 (emphasizing
“the real risk of bias presented by the potential for re-appointment of members of the Investment
Court”); see also Crawford, supra note 95, at 1020 (opining that removal of “the agency of the
investor from the appointment of arbitrators could pose challenges to the independence of
arbitrators in favour of the State”).
Later in this Article, the author indicates that arbitrators do not reflexively skew toward their
appointing parties, but join unanimous decisions in the overwhelming majority of cases. See infra
notes 160–62 and accompanying text. However, as also explained later in this Article, one may
attribute this at least in part to the countervailing need for arbitrators to maintain credibility and
stature within a small and elite group of peers appointed by investors, states, and institutions. See
infra notes 185–209 and accompanying text. To the extent that the EU’s proposed investment court
does not draw on the same closely knit professional group, to the extent that the states parties will
appoint all judges through a political selection process, and to the extent that investment courts’
structure reflects an effort to control the range of discretion that the principals (states) confer on
their agents (judges), one may anticipate that judges will in fact show greater sensitivity to the
policy preferences of the appointing states. One observer explains this dynamic when applying
Principal-Agent theory to investment treaty arbitration:
The size of the zone of discretion also has implications for the strategic relationship
between the Principals and their Agent. The smaller the zone of discretion, . . . the
greater the Agent’s interest will be in monitoring and anticipating the Principal’s
assessment of its activities. The analyst assumes that the Agent is more likely to take
decisions that conform to the Principals’ policy preferences to the extent that the Agent
wishes to avoid being censured and punished. . . .
See Alec Stone Sweet, Arbitration and Judicialization, 1 ONATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 1, 6 (2011),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988923.
114. See Andrew Cannon et al., European Commission Publishes Draft Investment Chapter for
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unlikely to embrace this regime because it institutionally shades toward
vindicating the political processes of host states, 115 which theoretically
skew toward irrational outcomes,116 and which have been found to cross
the threshold of arbitrary and even outrageous conduct with some
regularity in arbitral awards,117 especially with respect to certain
the TTIP, Including Investment Protection Provisions and the Establishment of an International
Investment Court, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS: ARBITRATION NOTES (Sept. 18, 2015, 11:15 AM),
http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2015/09/18/european-commission-publishes-draft-investmentchapter-for-the-ttip-including-investment-protection-provisions-and-the-establishment-of-aninternational-investment-court/ (noting that the “two third-country members will . . . be the
President and Vice President of the [Appeal] Tribunal,” and observing that this “places a great deal
of responsibility and sway in the hands of two individuals, whose views on Investment Protection
would then be very influential in shaping jurisprudence”).
115. See Laird, supra note 3, at 120 (suggesting that the pool of judges might be “only
representative of a defensive, governmental viewpoint”); see also Crawford, supra note 95, at 1021
(warning that the anticipated pool of judges “may result in tribunals of monochromatic experience
and uniform views”).
116. See supra notes 44–71 and accompanying text (discussing a systematic tendency toward
irrational decisionmaking on political issues).
117. See supra note 80 (discussing the Metalclad and Clayton/Bilcon cases); see also Crystallex
Int’l Corp. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, ¶¶ 594, 597, 612–14 (Apr. 4,
2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7194.pdf (involving a
case where the host state denied a mining permit without any scientific evidence and “blatantly
ignored” thousands of pages of supporting information submitted by the investor based on years of
research that cost millions of dollars, and in which the host state rescinded a contractual agreement
while knowing that there was no evidence of breach by the investor, and concluding that the host
state’s conduct was arbitrary and not based on legal standards or even the reasons put forward by
the host state); Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012–2, Award, ¶¶ 6.53–
6.71,
6.78-6.85
(Mar.
15,
2016),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw7443.pdf (involving termination of a mining concession under circumstances in
which the host state failed to protect the investor from violent anti-mining protests, ordered the
investor to cease mining operations (including the work needed for an environmental impact
statement) based on anti-mining sentiment among the local population, and terminated the
concession for failure to complete an environmental impact statement, which the tribunal described
as arbitrary government conduct); Belokon v. Kyrgyzstan, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶¶ 231–34 (Oct.
24,
2014),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ITA%20LAW%207008_0.pdf (involving temporary administration of a bank during a
period of violent regime change and concluding that there was no rational connection between the
state’s objectives and its actions, in part because deployment of the state’s security apparatus would
have been the logical response to violent attacks on the banking sector); OAO Tatneft v. Ukraine,
Award on the Merits, ¶¶ 147, 155, 165, 167, 396–97, 400, 403, 405 (UNCITRAL Arb. July 29,
2014) https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8622.pdf (involving a
matter that began as an alleged violation of Ukraine’s Labor Code, and escalated to a massive
deprivation of a refinery’s ownership and control accomplished in part by forcible occupation by
Interior Ministry troops, ex parte judicial proceedings, and criminal investigations that were not
pursued); Gemplus S.A. and Talsud S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case Nos. ARB(AF)/04/3 and
ARB(AF)/04/4, Award, ¶¶ 4–72, 4–73, 4–79, 4–80, 4–81, 4–82, 4–88, 4–175, 4–177, 7–25, 7–28,
7–67,
7–76
(June
26,
2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0357.pdf (involving the termination on national security grounds of a concession to
operate a vehicle registry in Mexico following an outpouring of public opposition, and describing
the host state’s actions as “manifestly irrational, arbitrary and perverse, being also conducted in bad
faith”); Desert Line Projects LLC v. Yemen, ICSID Case No., ARB/05/17, Award, ¶¶ 18, 22, 25–
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economic sectors.118
Even if investors come to the EU’s proposed investment court only
kicking and screaming, one response might be, “So what? Where else can
they go?” Here one needs to sound a second note of caution; one that may
dismay proponents of the EU’s plan for an investment court. Investment
arbitration has been around for much longer than investment treaty
arbitration.119 For decades before the proliferation of investment treaties,
multinational enterprises had the leverage to persuade host states to sign
investment contracts,120 which provided for arbitration and produced
27, 33, 38, 166–67, 179, 185 (Feb. 6, 2008), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0248_0.pdf (involving a host state that laid a military siege to the investor’s
construction site, the baseless arrest of managerial employees, including the investor’s son, and
refusal to afford the investor protection from harassment by armed bands); Loewen Group, Inc. v.
United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, ¶¶ 3–4, 53, 60, 105–06, 113, 119, 136, 217,
220–24,
237
(June
26,
2003),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0470.pdf (involving state-court proceedings in which a Mississippi plaintiff used
blatant appeals to prejudice to transform a $980,000 contract claim into a $500 million jury award,
and describing the proceedings as a “disgrace,” but dismissing the claim on technical grounds);
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, An Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement,
Award
in
Respect
of
Damages,
¶
68
(May
31,
2002),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0686.pdf (finding that the host
state’s administrative organs made “assertions of non-existent policy reasons” for “very
burdensome demands” for disclosures, threats, misrepresentations, and unjustified suggestions of
criminal investigations, and emphasizing that those actions “did shock and outrage the tribunal”);
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, ¶¶ 122–26, 162, 169, 171, 173, 176–79, 183, 185, 189,
193–95,
256,
268
(UNCITRAL
Arb.
Nov.
13,
2000),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0747.pdf (involving a prohibition on
exports of PCBs from Canada for destruction in the United States and imposing liability because
the measure increased environmental dangers and seemed transparently motivated by a desire to
protect Canadian remediation companies from foreign competition).
118. See Poulsen, supra note 106, at 8 (asserting that “[h]istorical experience, as well as recent
experience in parts of Latin America, shows that resource extraction sectors are particularly prone
to discriminatory or even predatory government interference”); see also Susan D. Franck, The
ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 825, 829
(2011) (recognizing that energy-sector cases made up the largest portion of investment treaty
disputes, and observing that foreign investment in the sector tends to be high-value, long-term, and
politically sensitive).
119. Compare Yackee, supra note 27, at 1574–96 (describing a number of contract-based
arbitrations between foreign investors and host states, beginning with the “famous Lena Goldfields
arbitration of 1930,” and continuing with the ARAMCO arbitration in the 1950s, the trilogy of
arbitrations resulting from Libyan oil nationalizations during the 1970s, the AMINOIL arbitration
resulting from a Kuwaiti oil nationalization during the 1970s, and other, lesser known arbitrations
from the same time periods), with José E. Alvarez, The Once and Future Foreign Investment
Regime, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W.
MICHAEL REISMAN 607, 617 (M.H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010) (opining that “[t]he 1990s, not the
1980s and certainly not the 1970s, were the era when the modern[,] [treaty-based] investment
regime was born”).
120. See Yackee, supra note 27, at 1612 (explaining that the regime of contract-based investorstate arbitration “has long existed independently” of treaty-based investor-state arbitration); Jason
Webb Yackee, Do We Really Need BITs? Toward a Return to Contract in International Investment
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memorable awards against host states.121 For multinational corporations
involved in large investment projects, that remains a live option, meaning
that they can vote with their feet.122 That, in turn, would transform the
proposed investment court into a small claims court reserved only for
small- and medium-sized investors,123 while the real action involving the
big players and points of principle takes place elsewhere,124 in
Law, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & HEALTH L. 121, 122 (2008) [hereinafter Yackee, Do We Really Need
BITS?] (making the point “that foreign investors engaged in the riskiest investment projects have
long had the ability to harness the powers of international law and international adjudication to
legally secure their economic relationships with developing country host states . . . through the
institution of contract”).
121. See supra note 119 (describing the long history of contract-based investor-state arbitration,
and the more recent emergence of treaty-based investor-state arbitration); see also ANDREAS F.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 495–510 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the trilogy of
contract-based Libyan oil nationalization cases, as well as the AMINOIL arbitration against Kuwait
for termination of an oil concession).
122. See Poulsen, supra note 106, at 8 (indicating that “very large
multinationals . . . are . . . able to bargain for investor-state contracts with similar or greater legal
guarantees than those provided in BITs”); see also Alvarez, supra note 119, at 619 (explaining that
“[i]t is wrong to assume that BITs constitute the only mechanism LDCs have to overcome” the
problem of providing foreign investors with credible guarantees; “[e]ven without BITs, LDCs have
long had . . . other methods to overcome [that] problem[,] [including] undertaking express
commitments to particular investors via contract”); Yackee, Do We Really Need BITs?, supra note
120, at 123 (opining that “a world without [investment treaty protection] would hardly be a disaster”
because “[f]oreign investors would . . . ask developing countries to provide [similar] guarantees
in . . . contractual instrument[s],” which “have long served as adequate (or even superior) [treaty]
substitutes”).
123. See Poulsen, supra note 106, at 25–26 (recognizing that “smaller investors may have less
bargaining power when negotiating contracts with host states compared to large multinationals”);
Yackee, Do We Really Need BITs?, supra note 120, at 140 (acknowledging that “small or mediumsized enterprises (SMEs)[] will not have the bargaining power to convince host states to grant them
contract-based rights that are more or less equivalent to those contained in BITs”); see also Charles
N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of
International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 481 (2009) (indicating that “contractual
arrangements . . . are . . . available only to investors with sufficient negotiating power,” and that
“small- or medium-scale investors are . . . in a more difficult position to negotiate for such
protections”).
124. It seems evident that a clear majority of investment treaty claims are brought by
multinational enterprises. See David Gaudkrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community 18 (OECD Working Papers on
Int’l Inv. 2012/03), http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-2012_3.pdf (indicating
that medium and large multinational enterprises account for about half the sample of investment
treaty claims, with extremely large multinational companies accounting for another 8 percent). In
addition, it seems evident that particularly large multinational companies tend to fare especially
well in investment treaty arbitration, both in terms of win-loss ratios and in terms of amounts
recovered. See Franck & Wylie, supra note 78, at 505, 516, 521 (indicating that Financial Times
500 companies have achieved higher levels of success than other corporate investors in investment
treaty claims); Gus Van Harten & Pavel Malysheuski, Who Has Benefitted Financially from
Investment Treaty Arbitration? An Evaluation of the Size and Wealth of Claimants 1–2 (Osgoode
Hall
Legal
Studies,
Research
Paper
No.
14,
2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2713876 (indicating that companies with
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accordance with rules directly negotiated by large corporations,125 and in
proceedings conducted outside the public view.126 That cannot be the
more than $1 billion in annual revenue and individuals with more than $100 million in net worth
have received 94.5 percent of the aggregate compensation awarded in investment treaty claims, and
that extra-large companies—with more than $10 billion in annual revenue—have enjoyed a success
rate in investment treaty arbitration (70.8 percent) that vastly exceeds the success rates of other
claimants (42.2 percent)).
125. See Poulsen, supra note 106, at 25 (indicating that investors may regard contracts as
superior legal instruments when compared to investment treaties, inasmuch as contracts allow
parties to use much more precise terms and to address a wider range of rights and obligations than
covered by investment treaties); Yackee, Do We Really Need BITs?, supra note 120, at 133 (same).
In addition, the decisions might arguably skew more toward investors in contractual disputes, in
the sense that contracts often include the sorts of precise undertakings that can restrict the wide
range of discretion normally enjoyed by states under international law. See supra note 80 (involving
cases where tribunals have imposed liability due at least in part to specific representations made by
the host state); Yackee, supra note 27, at 1597 (concluding that “[a]rbitral tribunals, staffed . . . with
highly accomplished Western (or Western-educated) lawyers inherently sympathetic . . . to the
notion of pacta sunt servanda as a foundational principle of all modern legal systems, had little
trouble determining that state promises should readily be upheld”); Yackee, Do We Really Need
BITs?, supra note 120, at 134 (indicating that investors in high-risk sectors often use stabilization
clauses in contracts to protect themselves from regulatory changes that would not be foreclosed by
investment treaties); see also LOWENFELD, supra note 121, at 495–511 (discussing the trilogy of
Libyan oil arbitrations and the AMINOIL arbitration, and describing the “emphasis on contract” as
a “striking feature” in the awards, which allowed the tribunals to reject arguments that international
law provided host governments with a wider range of discretion).
126. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 201–08 (2d ed.
2015) (explaining that the “confidentiality provisions in many [investment treaty] arbitrations are
different than those in most commercial settings,” and that “arbitral proceedings . . . in investment
[treaty] arbitrations are significantly more ‘transparent,’ and less confidential, than in international
commercial arbitrations”); Gary B. Born & Ethan G. Shenkman, Confidentiality and Transparency
in Commercial and Investor-State Arbitration, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 5,
21, 27, 37 (Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009) (noting that “[m]ost parties enter
into international commercial arbitration agreements with expectations of confidentiality,” and that
“[c]onfidentiality has played a less significant role in investor-state arbitrations than in international
commercial arbitrations,” but that “confidentiality obligations remain applicable to states when
they enter into international commercial arbitration agreements,” as opposed to investment
treaties); Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 13 PENN ST.
L. REV. 1269, 1287 (2009) (observing that “[c]onfidentiality is one of the distinctive features of
international commercial arbitration,” but that “procedural aspects of transparency that are starting
to characterize investment [treaty] arbitration”); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent
Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1603 n.395 (2005) (indicating that “arbitrations brought by
investors that involve[] disputes under normal commercial agreements, such as concession
contracts . . . do not involve the interpretation of investment treaties and public international law
rights” and, therefore, the “policy points which [might] weigh in favor of transparency are absent,”
meaning that “presumptions of confidentiality should not be displaced”); Diana Marie Wick, The
Counter-Productivity of ICSID Denunciations and Proposals for Change, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L.
239, 281 (2012) (opining that “[i]n contrast to the complete confidentiality of international
commercial arbitration, . . . [investment treaty] arbitration necessarily requires some
transparency”). To the extent that positive international law and international practice have
established an emerging norm of transparency in disputes between foreign investors and host states,
the relevant instruments expressly apply only to arbitrations brought under investment treaties, as
opposed to purely contractual undertakings. See UNCITRAL, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
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intent of TTIP’s drafters, but it represents a likely consequence of the
proposed investment court.
The point is that investment treaty disputes represent political
disputes.127 The political context creates incentives for stakeholders and
officeholders to make irrational choices.128 Traditionally, investment
treaties have served as tools that enable foreign investors to challenge
irrational outcomes of political processes in host states.129 Backing away
from that function may not represent a good idea, and it may backfire by
triggering the reinvigoration of older traditions that more clearly serve
the interests of foreign investors and more sharply diverge from the
public justice goals embodied in TTIP.130
V. ADDRESSING CONCERNS ABOUT DEMOCRATIC DYSFUNCTION WITHIN
ISDS
Before closing, one needs to address the potential rejoinder that ISDS,
in its present form, shares many of the flaws ascribed to democratic
decisionmaking. According to this view, investors may share the
propensity for ignorance and irrational beliefs generally attributed to
stakeholders with respect to political issues in democratic systems.
Likewise, arbitrators may function like politicians, indulging the beliefs
and preferences of stakeholders (either investors or respondent states) in

TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION, art. 1(1), (Dec. 10, 2014),
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/TransparencyConvention-e.pdf (“This Convention applies to arbitration between an investor and a State or a
regional economic integration organization conducted on the basis of an investment treaty
concluded before 1 April 2014.”); UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based InvestorState
Arbitration,
art.
1(1)
(Apr.
1,
2014),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-onTransparency-E.pdf (“The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration . . . shall apply to investor-State arbitration initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules pursuant to a treaty providing for the protection of investments or investors . . . concluded on
or after 1 April 2014 unless the Parties to the treaty have agreed otherwise.”).
127. See supra notes 1, 6–28 and accompanying text (explaining different political contexts in
which investment treaty disputes often occur).
128. See supra notes 29–71 and accompanying text (discussing political issues in democratic
systems and the systematic making of irrational choices by stakeholders and officeholders).
129. See supra notes 28, 72 and accompanying text (explaining the political context of most
investment treaties and the challenge they can present to the political processes in host states).
130. See supra notes 110–26 and accompanying text (explaining why a retreat from investorstate arbitration might not be a good idea, and why it could backfire); cf. Cecilia Malmstrom,
Proposing an Investment Court System, EUROPEAN COMMISSION: BLOG (Sept. 16, 2015),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/malmstrom/blog/proposinginvestment-court-system_en (describing the EU’s proposed investment court as “a public justice
system – just like those we’re familiar with in our own countries, and the international courts which
Europe has so actively promoted in the past”). The author of the blog post is the EU Commissioner
for Trade.
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order to secure future appointments. Viewed from that perspective, the
case for treating investor-state arbitration as a useful counterweight to
democratic dysfunction arguably collapses.131
As a preliminary matter, it seems unreasonable to ascribe ignorance to
the general run of claimants in investment treaty arbitrations. While a
handful of cases involve hapless individuals who clearly ventured out of
their depth,132 most claims involve large and sophisticated enterprises.133
For such entities, foreign investments fall on the practical side of life,
where the stakes are high, where enterprises reap the benefits of making
good choices about investments, and where enterprises experience the
losses associated with making bad choices about investments.134 Under
these circumstances, enterprises planning to make substantial foreign
investments tend to devote considerable time and effort to the
development of information about anticipated projects, political risk, and
the legal environment for the protection of foreign investment.135 At least
131. The author thanks Professor David Schneiderman for the basic insight, particularly with
respect to arbitrators, while emphasizing that Professor Schneiderman might not express himself in
exactly the same terms.
132. See Azinian v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, Award, ¶¶
29–30, 32–33, 107 (Nov. 1, 1999), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0057.pdf. (expressing the view that the individual claimants did not represent an
“inherently plausible group of investors,” inasmuch as they had virtually no relevant experience,
assets, cash flow, or history of successful business ventures; describing their business plans as
something on the order of “fantasy;” and concluding that at least one claimant “may have been well
out of his depth in an unfamiliar environment”).
133. See supra note 124 (demonstrating that a majority of investment treaty claims are brought
by multinational enterprises); see also JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES 33 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010) (noting that “[o]ne of the principal types of foreign investor
is the ‘multinational corporation’ (MNC) or ‘multinational enterprise’ (MNE)”); Daniel Behn,
Legitimacy, Evolution, and Growth in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Empirically Evaluating the
State of the Art, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 363, 370, 384 (2015) (analyzing 147 investment treaty disputes
partially or fully resolved between September 2011 and September 2014, and concluding that the
claimant was “a large MNE in fifty-eight cases, an extra-large MNE in thirty-seven cases, and a
Global 500 company in twenty-four cases”).
134. Compare supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text (describing the factors that tend to
encourage rational decisionmaking in the practical aspects of life).
135. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 25, at 77 (explaining that a “key feature in the design
of [long-term, large-scale] foreign investment is to lay out in advance the risks inherent in such a
long-term relationship, both from a business perspective and from a legal point of view”); NOAH
RUBINS & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, POLITICAL RISK AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 25–29 (2005) (describing the elements of, participants in, and sources of information
for, a proper investment risk analysis); see also Michael R. Reading, Note, The Bilateral Investment
Treaty in ASEAN: A Comparative Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 679, 686 (1992) (explaining that
“[f]oreign investors conduct a risk-return analysis, and if the risk outweighs the potential return,
they will not make an investment”). But see Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts: An
Empirical Study of Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 311 (2001)
(opining that the “investment decisions of foreign businesses have not always been based on a
rational assessment of the relative risks and gains,” inasmuch as “[i]nvestors in China often lack
sufficient information to make a rational choice”); Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment
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on the topic of their own foreign investments, these stakeholders do not
choose ignorance.
Similarly, one cannot reasonably ascribe irrational beliefs to the
general run of potential claimants in investment treaty arbitrations.
Again, these are not individuals likely to be motivated by the desire for
an emotional charge or an enhanced sense of identity. 136 Most potential
claimants are large corporations,137 led by experienced officers and
directors, who are advised by in-house and outside counsel, and who have
fiduciary duties to maximize the wealth of shareholders. If such
individuals systematically hold irrational beliefs about investment risk or
the legal regime for the protection of foreign investment, they are likely
to experience substantial personal costs, including the prospect of
termination and long-term career setbacks.138 In particular, they seem
unlikely to initiate and pursue baseless investment treaty claims
irrationally,139 inasmuch as legal costs run into the millions of dollars for
Treaties Promote Foreign Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L.
397, 432 (2011) (discussing studies suggesting that “multinational corporations often implement
political risk assessment in ad hoc, weakly institutionalized kinds of ways”).
136. While individuals do in fact bring investment treaty claims, studies indicate that the
proportion of arbitrations brought by individual investors is less than 10 to 15 percent. See Franck
& Wylie, supra note 78, at 459, 482, 500 n.182 (analyzing a data set of 159 concluded investment
treaty cases up to January 1, 2012, and concluding that 14.5 percent of final awards involved claims
brought only by individual investors); Gaudkrodger & Gordon, supra note 124, at 18, fig. 1
(analyzing a data set of fifty investment treaty arbitrations administered by ICSID and forty-five
investment treaty arbitrations brought under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and indicating that
individual claimants brought between 5 and 10 percent of the claims in both groups). In bringing
claims, individual investors generally do not appear to harbor irrational expectations. To the
contrary, individual investors appear to succeed on the merits more regularly than corporations in
general. See Franck & Wylie, supra note 78, at 469 (explaining that “the most robust predictor [of
success] was whether the investors were human beings or corporations, with cases brought by
people exhibiting greater success than corporations”); Van Harten & Malysheuski, supra note 124,
at 2–5 (listing eighty-six investment treaty cases in which tribunals had rendered awards on liability
and damages, and including twenty-five claims brought by individual investors, suggesting that
individual investors have an unusually high success rate).
137. See supra notes 124, 133 (stating that a majority of investment treaty claims are brought
by multinational enterprises).
138. Compare supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text (generally discussing the
consequences of making irrational choices in the practical aspects of life, including in the
professional and employment contexts).
139. Of course, when the stakes are sufficiently high and involve huge sums or core business
interests, rational investors may pursue expensive claims despite relatively low chances of success.
See Philip Morris Asia, Ltd. v. The Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012–12, Award
on
Jurisdiction,
¶¶
8,
89,
96–98,
585–88
(Dec.
17,
2015),
https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1711 (involving a claim in excess of $4 billion relating
to the adoption of tobacco plain packaging laws and regulations, and concluding that the investor
abusively sought to engineer jurisdiction through stock transfers to an affiliate located in a
jurisdiction having favorable treaty relations after the time at which the dispute became reasonably
foreseeable).
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each party,140 and tribunals have come to prefer some version of the
“loser-pays” principle in awarding costs.141 Given the absence of
subjective preferences, the rewards for making good choices, and the
penalties for making bad choices, it lacks credibility to suggest that
potential claimants systematically make irrational choices in asserting or
pursuing investment treaty claims.
Even if investors are informed and behave rationally in pursuing
investment treaty claims, one could not defend ISDS in its current format
if arbitrators acted like politicians by indulging the views of appointing
parties in an effort to secure repeat appointments or future
appointments.142 Addressing that concern at a high level of generality, it
seems relevant to observe that arbitrators, even party-appointed
arbitrators, are not supposed to act like politicians who serve in a
representative capacity. To the contrary, they are supposed to function
more like judges,143 who have obligations of independence and
140. See Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound: Investor-State
Arbitration of IP Monopolies on Medicines—Eli Lilly v. Canada and the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement, 23 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 17 (2015) (reporting that the “average cost of arbitral
proceedings is nearly $8 million, although the Philippines’s tribunal costs and legal costs in a single
case exceeded $50 million”); Gaudkrodger & Gordon, supra note 124, at 19 (indicating that “legal
and arbitration costs for the parties in recent ISDS cases have averaged over USD 8 million with
costs exceeding USD 30 million in some cases”); Peter K. Yu, The Investment-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 829, 874 (2017) (stating that costs in investment
treaty arbitrations “remain high with averages of about $8-10 million and amounts as high as over
$30 million”).
141. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 25, at 299–300 (observing that “recently tribunals
have shown a growing inclination to adopt the principle that costs follow the event,” but explaining
that an award of costs against the losing party will “more frequently” be partial and not total);
Gaudkrodger & Gordon, supra note 124, at 22 (indicating that “[t]he ‘pay your own way’
rule . . . has been used overall more often than other approaches,” but recognizing that “[t]he trend
in recent cases is toward the shifting of at least some costs”).
142. See Sergio Puig, Blinding International Justice, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 647, 663 (2016) (“The
practice of each party appointing one of the arbitrators raises concerns that arbitrators will behave
as representatives for the interests of the appointer and not as neutral adjudicators.”).
143. Viewed from a broader perspective, arbitrators differ from judges in the sense that they
receive appointments for only one matter at a time, meaning that they may have to engage in
counsel or expert work to supplement income, which can raise concerns that arbitrators may render
decisions that support the positions they take as advocates and experts. See Michael D. Goldhaber,
The Rise of Arbitral Power Over Domestic Courts, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 373, 406–07 (2013)
(observing that “[i]nvestment arbitrators are private individuals who sell their services as
adjudicators, of a few recurring legal issues, to litigants on the open market,” and also may
“continue to sell their services as advocates on the open market,” which casts doubt upon their
independence); William W. Park, Arbitrator Integrity: The Transient and the Permanent, 46 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 629, 648 (2009) (noting that arbitrators sometimes must address “the very same
issues presented to him or his law firm as advocate in another case,” that “[i]t is not difficult to see
why such situations might compromise the integrity of the arbitral process,” and that such
arbitrators “might be tempted . . . to add a sentence to an award that could later be cited in another
case”).
As a practical matter, however, few individuals engage in this form of “double-hatting” on any
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impartiality,144 as well as obligations to render decisions on the basis of
law.145 Normally, we expect judges, even elected judges, not to act like
significant scale. See Loretta Malintoppi, Independence, Impartiality, and Duty of Disclosure of
Arbitrators, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 789, 825 (Peter
Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008) (opining that the “number of practitioners acting as counsel and
arbitrators in investment arbitration is still relatively small”); Lacey Yong, “Double Hatting”
Under
New
Scrutiny,
GLOBAL
ARBITRATION
REVIEW
(June
5,
2017),
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1142550/”double-hatting”-under-new-scrutiny
(indicating that “the major critiques of investment arbitration based on double hatting would
‘evaporate’ if some 10 to 15 individuals agreed to forego the practice”). For a variety of reasons,
many individuals have chosen to renounce counsel work and to sit exclusively, or almost
exclusively, as arbitrators for investment treaty matters. ROGERS, supra note 28, at 320; see also
Jeff Gray, Norton Rose Loses “Great Leader” Over Merger, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 21, 2011),
https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/streetwise/norton-rose-loses-great-leaderover-merger/article618477/ (reporting that renowned arbitrator Yves Fortier was leaving the firm
to pursue his career as an independent arbitrator); Luke Eric Peterson, Arbitrator Decries
“Revolving Door” Roles of Lawyers in Investment Treaty Arbitration, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
REPORTER (Feb. 25, 2010) https://www.iareporter.com/articles/arbitrator-decries-revolving-doorroles-of-lawyers-in-investment-treaty-arbitration/ (reporting that Professor Philippe Sands QC
“ceased taking on new investment treaty cases as counsel in mid-2007 so that he could begin to
accept arbitrator appointments”); Douglas Tomson, Alexandrov Quits Sidley Austin to Go Solo,
GLOBAL
ARBITRATION
REVIEW
(Aug.
2,
2017),
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1145245/alexandrov-quits-sidley-austin-to-go-solo
(reporting that Stanimir Alexandrov is leaving the firm to “set up his own practice as an arbitrator”).
When certain individuals have chosen to pursue arbitrator and counsel roles simultaneously,
courts and appointing authorities have occasionally ordered them to choose one role or the other.
See, e.g., The Republic of Ghana v. Telekom Malaysia Berhad, Petition No. HA/RK 2004.667,
Decision on Challenge of Prof. Emmanuel Gaillard, ¶ 5 (Hague D. Ct. Oct. 18, 2004),
https://www.italaw.com/documents/TelekomMalaysiaChallengeDecision.pdf;
Gallo
v.
Government of Canada, Decision on Challenge to J. Christopher Thomas, Q.C., ¶ 36 (ICSID
Deputy
S-G
Oct.
14,
2005),
https://www.italaw.com/documents/Gallo-CanadaThomas_Challenge-Decision_002.pdf.
144. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 25, at 280 (indicating that arbitrators must be
independent of the parties, and that conflicts of interest operate as bars to appointment and may
lead to disqualification); Puig, supra note 142, at 663 (observing that “international lawyers widely
believe that arbitrators should act independently, and independent judgment is required by the main
international arbitration rules”).
145. See G.A. Res. 65/22, art. 35(1), UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Dec. 6, 2010) (“The
arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law designated by the parties as applicable to the substance
of the dispute. Failing such designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law which
it determines to be appropriate.”); Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States art. 42(1), Oct. 17, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID
Convention] (“The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be
agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the
Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of
international law as may be applicable.”); Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, art. 37, 36 Stat. 2199 (Oct. 18, 1907) (“International arbitration has for its
object the settlement of disputes between States by Judges of their own choice and on the basis of
respect for law.”); see also 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 30(1),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf (providing that when an investor
alleges violations of standards set forth in the BIT, “the tribunal shall decide the issues in dispute
in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules of international law”).
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politicians when making decisions,146 although they may have normative
preferences on legal topics where there is no binding precedent and
decisions have not yet clustered around a general consensus.147
Moving from the level of ideals to practical experience, there is some
evidence that elected judges on national and international courts alter
their decisionmaking patterns during election cycles in ways that seem
calculated to enhance their chances for return to office.148 Similarly, one
has to acknowledge that arbitrators in investment treaty disputes
continuously stand for election in the sense that they are always on the
market for appointments,149 and arguably have incentives to conduct
themselves in ways that increase their chances for future appointments.150
According to critics of ISDS, these incentives encourage arbitrators to
146. See Sarah C. Benesh, Judicial Elections: Directions in the Study of Legitimacy, 96
JUDICATURE 204, 207 (2013) (indicating that “[p]eople in the U.S. like to elect their judges,” but
that “they also want those judges, once in office, to behave differently from ‘mere’ politicians”);
H.A. “Skip” Walther, Money and Justice Don’t Mix, 66 J. MO. B. 121, 121 (2010) (observing that
“[w]e ask our elected judges to set aside political aspirations and dispense justice impartially”).
147. See Daniel Freeman, Comment, One Case, Two Decisions: Khalid v. Bush, In re
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, and the Neutral Decisionmaker, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 241, 242
(2006) (describing how the same motion landed in front of two judges, exploring how and why two
judges reached radically different legal conclusions, and opining that in the “absence of clear
instruction from higher courts” each judge manipulated authority to conform to his or her normative
preferences). This phenomenon may be particularly pronounced in the context of evolving
international norms. See James Allan & Grant Huscroft, Constitutional Rights Coming Home to
Roost? Rights Internationalism in American Courts, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 56 (2006):
This is precisely the sort of picking-and-choosing that can be expected with
internationalism. In a world of sometimes widely-differing decisions . . . , the normative
preferences of the judges hearing particular cases are likely to determine whether or not
a particular foreign or international precedent makes its way into a judicial decision.
148. See Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind
When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 248, 261 (2004) (indicating that elected statecourt judges in Pennsylvania impose harsher sentences for crimes when facing reelection
campaigns); Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European
Court of Human Rights, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 427 (2008) (indicating that judges facing
mandatory retirement were 12 percent more likely to vote against their national governments than
judges facing reelection to the European Court of Human Rights).
149. See Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 112, at 646 (explaining that “in the present
system . . . , potential arbitrators effectively ‘stand for election’ by parties every time a new case is
brought”).
150. See Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of
Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 85 (2010) (acknowledging that “prospective
arbitrators who compete in the market for appointments might wish to behave in a way that
increases their chances of appointment”); Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in
International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341, 343 (2007) (recounting arguments to the effect that
“arbitrators have an incentive to favor repeat players in the hopes that a favorable award will
translate into future appointments”); Rogers, supra note 27, at 248 (recounting arguments to the
effect that “[a]rbitrators’ lack of secure tenure and ensured compensation . . . undermine the
administrative independence that protects independence and impartiality in national courts and
public international law tribunals”).
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rule for investors.151 However, this criticism seems to ignore the fact that
investors appoint only one of three tribunal members, that respondent
states also get to appoint arbitrators,152 and that the most notorious case
of predisposition involved an arbitrator appointed by a state who was
subjected to pressure by officials of the appointing state, and who
arguably swung a large and controversial dispute in favor of the state.153
While helpful to keep in mind that the perceived incentives for party151. See, e.g., VAN HARTEN, supra note 26, at 152–53, 172–73.
152. See Brower & Schill, supra note 123, at 495 (explaining that “the capacity of states to
appoint arbitrators in investment-treaty arbitration counters any potential pro-investor bias that the
investor-appointed arbitrator might evince”); Park, supra note 143, at 659 (observing that “[h]ost
states appoint as many arbitrators as investors”); José E. Alvarez, Book Review, Investment Treaty
Arbitration and Public Law by Gus Van Harten, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 909, 914 (2008) (emphasizing
the fact that “states’ ongoing involvement in investor-state dispute settlement is also assured
through states’ rights to appoint one of the three arbitrators typically designated to hear investment
disputes”).
153. According to public statements made by Judge Abner Mikva, the U.S.-appointed arbitrator
in Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States (and also a former congressman, federal appellate judge,
and White House counsel), lawyers from the Department of Justice informed him that an adverse
ruling could prompt the U.S. government to withdraw from NAFTA. Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard
in International Dispute Resolution, 7 WORLD ARB. & MED. REV. 205, 210–13 (2013); see also
V.V. Veeder, The Historical Keystone to International Arbitration: The Party Appointed
Arbitrator—From Miami to Geneva, in PRACTISING VIRTUE 127, 129–30 (David D. Caron et al.,
eds., 2015) (addressing the Loewen arbitration and Judge Mikva’s role); Juan Fernandez-Armesto,
Salient Issues in International Arbitration, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 721, 725 (2012) (laying out
examples of the “miscarriages of justice” sometimes caused by party appointed arbitrators); David
Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration: Seeking an Explanation
for Conflicting Outcomes, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 383, 404–05 (2010) (discussing the comments
made by Judge Mikva); Jason Webb Yackee, Book Review, The Reasons Requirement in
International Investment Arbitration: Critical Case Studies, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 629, 635 (2009)
(discussing briefly the Loewen award and Judge Mikva’s role). At least some well-regarded
observers have speculated that this intervention prompted Judge Mikva to convince other tribunal
members to dismiss an otherwise meritorious case on rather technical grounds. Paulsson, supra, at
7; Schneiderman, supra, at 405; see also Jose E. Alvarez, Three Responses to “Proliferating”
Tribunals, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 991, 1008 (2009) (speculating that the arbitrators framed
their decision “to avoid the political backlash that would likely have been generated had they
overturned the result reached by a Mississippi jury”). But see Veeder, supra, at 130–31 (concluding
that the arbitrator’s statements do not reflect a commitment to make improper decisions favoring
the United States, and finding it “utterly inconceivable that the two other arbitrators . . . could have
been pressured in turn by the American arbitrator into agreeing to that which they were not minded
to agree”).
More recently, in a boundary arbitration between Slovenia and Croatia, transcripts of wiretaps
revealed that Slovenia’s agent had engaged in clandestine, ex parte discussions with the arbitrator
appointed by Slovenia, which included discussions of how best to influence the tribunal’s
deliberations in Slovenia’s favor and also included advance disclosure that the tribunal would in
fact render a decision generally favoring Slovenia. Arman Savarian & Rudy Baker, Arbitration
Between Croatia and Slovenia: Leaks, Wiretaps, Scandal, EJIL: TALK! (July 28, 2015),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/arbitration-between-croatia-and-slovenia-leaks-wiretaps-scandal/. More
than one observer has expressed the view that this may not represent isolated behavior between
states and arbitrators appointed by states. See Philippe Sands, Reflections on International
Judicialization, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 885, 898–99 (2016); Savarian & Baker, supra.
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appointed arbitrators theoretically work both for investors and for
states,154 and would operate differently for presiding arbitrators,155 the
prospect of engrained predisposition seems unsettling, no matter which
way(s) it cuts. According to two prominent members of the profession,
the problem of predisposition by party-appointed arbitrators is real.156
While one author uses a limited universe of anecdotes to support the
point,157 the second observer undertook an empirical study, which
purports to show that dissenting opinions written by party-appointed
arbitrators in investment treaty arbitrations support the appointing party
nearly 100 percent of the time.158 According to the second observer, the
results of his study provide a strong indication of bias by party-appointed
arbitrators,159 and even suggest an emerging expectation for partyappointed arbitrators to dissent from awards that rule against the parties
who appoint them.160
At first blush, the study appears to support the proposition that partyappointed arbitrators behave more like politicians than judges. 161 The
154. See Park, supra note 143, at 661 (noting that the “incentives to ‘repeat player’ status can
operate just as well for individuals known in the arbitration community to be regularly appointed
by host states”).
155. See Julie A. Maupin, Public and Private in International Investment Law: An Integrated
Systems Approach, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 367, 386 n.73 (2014) (assuming that presiding arbitrators
wish to maximize their own personal reappointment prospects, but emphasizing that “it is not clear
that this would be accomplished by favoring claimants over states, since the overall survival of the
regime depends upon continued state support”); Park, supra note 143, at 659 (observing that “a
presiding arbitrator must be acceptable to both sides”).
156. See Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 112, at 619–20 (“Two of the most well-regarded and
distinguished members of our profession—Professors Jan Paulsson and Albert Jan van den Berg—
recently authored articles that seemed to presume that party-appointed arbitrators are untrustworthy
and will violate their mandate to be and to remain independent and impartial.”); see generally
Paulsson, supra note 153 (exploring moral hazards created by the use of party-appointed arbitrators
in international arbitration); Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed
Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 821 (Mahnoush Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011) (discussing
dissenting opinions by party-appointed arbitrators in investment treaty arbitration).
157. See Paulsson, supra note 153, at 207–16 (discussing three examples of misbehavior by
party-appointed arbitrators, one from the early twentieth century and two from the early twentyfirst century).
158. Van den Berg, supra note 156, at 824–25.
159. See id. at 825 (“That nearly 100 percent of dissents favor the party that appointed the
dissenter raises concerns about neutrality. . . . The nearly 100 percent score is difficult to reconcile
with the neutrality requirement.”).
160. See id. at 830 (“The practice of dissents in investment arbitration may have even reached
the point where a party-appointed arbitrator is now expected to dissent if the party that appointed
him or her has lost the case entirely or in part.”).
161. See ROGERS, supra note 28, at 332 (acknowledging that “[v]an den Berg’s data does indeed
seem at first blush to be a striking indictment of party-appointed arbitrators”); Rogers, supra note
27, at 242 (recognizing that 100 percent “is a number that captures attention and, perhaps
predictably, has been cited as a source of support for proposed reforms by Jan Paulsson, another
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problem is that the individual who conducted the study appears to have
over-interpreted the data. At most, the data establishes that when partyappointed arbitrators dissent, they invariably support the appointing
party. However, even according to the study, party-appointed arbitrators
rarely dissent. In fact, the study indicates that party-appointed arbitrators
have dissented from only 22 percent of awards.162 As others have
observed, this percentage seems to include several coding errors and
almost certainly should be lower.163 More recent studies indicate a
dissent rate in the range of 14.4 percent to 17 percent for investment treaty
claims.164 In other words, the vast majority of awards are rendered
unanimously, and dissents occur only rarely in investment treaty disputes.
Others have expressed surprise at the low rate of dissents in investment
treaty arbitration.165 Given the relatively early stage in the development
of investment treaty jurisprudence, the presence of ideological divides
among stakeholders, and the politically charged nature of the disputes,
one might expect to see more routine clashes among the views of
arbitrators.166 However, the low frequency of dissents represents an
established fact. It also undermines the proposition that party-appointed
arbitrators act like politicians when deciding cases; if party-appointed
arbitrators acted purely as agents for the parties who appointed them, all

leading arbitrator and scholar, that party-appointed arbitrators be abolished altogether”).
162. See van den Berg, supra note 156, at 824 (discussing statistics of dissenting opinions by
party-appointed arbitrators in practice). Inverting the same figures, critics have referred to the 78
percent unanimity rate in awards covered by van den Berg’s study. Brower & Rosenberg, supra
note 112, at 653; Rogers, supra note 27, at 245.
163. See Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 112, at 654–58 (indicating that five of the thirty-four
“dissents” included in van den Berg’s dataset were miscoded in the sense that they are “benign or
actually disfavor the party that appointed the dissenter”); Rogers, supra note 27, at 245–46
(discussing, and apparently agreeing with, the coding errors identified by Brower and Rosenberg).
164. See Audley Sheppard & Daphna Kapeliuk-Klinger, Dissents in International Arbitration,
in THE ROLES OF PSYCHOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 313, 320 (Tony Cole ed., 2017)
(“Between 2011 and 2014, ICSID authenticated at least seventy publicly known final awards, in
respect of which twelve arbitrators issued dissenting opinions, i.e., in approximately 17% of cases,
which means 83% were unanimous.”); C. Mark Baker & Lucy Greenwood, Dissent—But Only If
You Really Feel You Must: Why Dissenting Opinions in International Commercial Arbitration
Should Only Appear in Exceptional Circumstances, 7 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 31, 34–35 (2013) (“Since
van den Berg concluded his study, there have been approximately 111 further awards, in which
there were 16 dissents (i.e., approximately 14.4 percent).”); Anton Strezhnev, You Only Dissent
Once: Re-Appointment and Legal Practices in Investment Arbitration 2 (Nov. 8, 2015)
(unpublished research note), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/astrezhnev/files/dissent_draft_1.pdf
(“Among disputes filed before [ICSID], . . . between January, 1972 and April, 2015, roughly 80%
of final awards were unanimous and only about 14.5% of decisions came with a dissenting opinion
attached.”).
165. See, e.g., Strezhnev, supra note 164, at 2 (referring to the low rate of dissents as “one
particularly puzzling aspect of investment arbitration”).
166. Rogers, supra note 27, at 245; Strezhnev, supra note 164, at 2, 5–6.
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proceedings would end in 2-1 decisions.167 That clearly does not
represent the norm for investment treaty arbitrations.168
A more nuanced and tightly controlled experiment studied the
behavior of experienced counsel and arbitrators, who were asked to
render mock decisions on the allocation of costs in fictional investment
treaty arbitrations.169 Participants were randomly told that they were
appointed by the prevailing party, the losing party, jointly by the parties,
or appointed without any attribution.170 The organizers of the study
concluded that party-appointed arbitrators were more likely to prefer
outcomes that favored the appointing party, and that the increased
likelihood amounted to roughly twenty percentage points.171 Based on
that data, the authors generally concluded that party-appointed arbitrators
have a substantial bias toward the parties that appoint them.172
However, the organizers of the study seem to over-extrapolate from
limited data in at least two respects. First, their experiment did not solicit
any decisions regarding the substance of investment treaty obligations,
but only decisions regarding the allocation of costs. 173 This limitation
seems critical because there is a thickening jurisprudence on substantive
obligations,174 and the application of that jurisprudence would have
constrained the ability of arbitrators to render decisions based on
167. See Strezhnev, supra note 164, at 2 (noting that “if each arbitrator was a perfect agent of
their appointer, then the typical outcome for an arbitration tribunal would be a 2-1 decision driven
by the swing vote of the presiding arbitrator”).
168. See supra notes 162–164 and accompanying text (discussing the results of van den Berg’s
and other studies); see also Strezhnev, supra note 164, at 2 (observing that “this does not appear to
be the case”).
169. Sergio Puig & Anton Strezhnev, Affiliation Bias in Arbitration: An Experimental
Approach, Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 16-31 (Aug. 2016), at 1, 4–5, 17–22,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2830241.
170. Id. at 18–19.
171. Id. at 25, 31–32.
172. See id. at 1 (asserting that the study confirms that “professional arbitrators suffer from
affiliation effects—a cognitive predisposition to favor the appointing party”); id. at 44 (concluding
that “the frequent use of party-appointed arbitrators is likely to result in litigant-induced biases”
because “being appointed by one of the parties . . . directly changes the behavior of arbitrators” in
the sense that “the appointment itself causes some of the bias towards one’s appointing party”).
173. Id. at 19–20.
174. See, e.g., José Enrique Alvarez, The Public International Law Regime Governing
International Investment, 344 RECUEIL DES COURS 195, 353–54 (2011) (observing that even among
the large number of famously “inconsistent” decisions relating to measures taken during
Argentina’s political, economic, and social crisis, “there is a great deal of agreement among the
relevant decisions with respect to the relevant law,” including “considerable arbitral common
ground when it comes to the meaning of the relevant substantive investment guarantees, from fair
and equitable treatment to protection against expropriation”); Charles H. Brower II, Structure,
Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37, 66 (2003)
(observing that “the awards of [NAFTA] Chapter 11 tribunals have reached a high level of
coherence on many issues”).
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affiliation bias.175 In fact, the organizers of the study anticipated that
mock arbitrators would essentially have reached uniform conclusions if
the experiment had focused on well-developed substantive
obligations,176 a position that seems consistent with the proposition that
arbitrators generally decide cases on the basis of law as opposed to
affiliation bias.177
To increase the anticipated diversity of outcomes, the organizers of the
study chose to focus their experiment on allocation of costs because the
issue is not subject to clear legal rules, because the applicable arbitration
rules expressly call for the exercise of discretion in allocating costs, and
because the lack of clear standards has given rise to a multiplicity of
approaches within the profession.178 Even in this open-ended
environment, the authors found that party-appointed arbitrators favored
the parties that appointed them only if the arbitrators did not already favor
the American rule on costs (parties pay their own costs) as a matter of
principle; if they did favor the American rule, even party-appointed
arbitrators decided the issue on the basis of principle instead of affiliation
bias.179 Finally, when party-appointed arbitrators proposed allocations of
costs that favored appointing parties, they tended to do so incrementally
and not decisively.180 In other words, the study establishes that
175. See Stephan W. Schill, System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking,
12 GERMAN L.J. 1083, 1100 (2011) (discussing the “convergence of investment treaty
jurisprudence towards a jurisprudence constante,” which “increasingly has the effect that
investment treaty tribunals perceive themselves as agents of a treaty-overarching regime for the
protection of foreign investment, which they feel bound to apply”); Thomas Wälde, National Tax
Measures Affecting Foreign Investors Under the Discipline of International Investment Treaties,
102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 55, 57 (2008) (“There is no formal system of precedent in
international investment law; nor can there be one given the large number of detailed and quite
distinct treaties at stake. But a practice of ‘persuasive precedent’ is emerging; in several areas, that
has reached the level of settled case law (‘jurisprudence constante’).”); see also Christoph Schreuer
& Matthew Weiniger, A Doctrine of Precedent?, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 143, at 1188–
89 (“In actual fact, tribunals in investment disputes . . . rely on previous decisions of other tribunals
whenever they can.”).
176. See Puig & Strezhnev, supra note 169, at 20 (explaining that they chose to study behavior
with respect to cost allocation because it represents “a question on which there is little preexisting
legal guidance . . . and therefore [a] high level of discretion—otherwise participants would all
reach very similar if not identical answers”) (emphasis added).
177. See Brower & Schill, supra note 123, at 492 (“[I]nvestment-treaty arbitration in its decision
making process is an adjudicatory process based on independent fact-finding and legal analysis
according to rules of law by neutral, independent, and impartial decision makers.”).
178. Puig & Strezhnev, supra note 169, at 20.
179. Id. at 32.
180. For example, when appointed by the losing party, a plurality of mock arbitrators still
allocated all costs to the losing party. Id. at 24, fig. 3. A slightly smaller proportion of those mock
arbitrators allocated some of the winning party’s costs to the losing party, which seems favorable
to the losing party, but only in an incremental way. Id. Less than one-third of those mock arbitrators
would split costs evenly, which represents the most decisively positive outcome for the losing party.
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predisposition may appear incrementally on collateral issues where the
law is silent, where discretion is at its height, and where the arbitrators
are not already wedded to principles that require contrary decisions. The
proposition seems unremarkable, and a far cry from the broader claim
that party-appointed arbitrators generally incline toward the parties who
appoint them.
As a second example of possible over-extrapolation, the organizers of
the experiment told mock arbitrators that they were party-appointed
arbitrators and solicited their views on the allocation of costs without
making any attempt to replicate the process of deliberation with coarbitrators. The scenario is not realistic and ignores a definitive step in
the collegial decisionmaking process,181 which provides a critical check
against prejudgment and bias,182 and also represents the context in which
individual opinions are most likely to be challenged and to shift.183 In
other words, the study captures how party-appointed arbitrators might
behave if left unchecked. But no matter how party-appointed arbitrators
might incline on ancillary, discretionary issues before the start of
Id. Also, when appointed by the winning party, mock arbitrators seemed only 20 percent more
likely to allocate all costs to the losing party and only 20 percent less likely to allocate only some
of the costs to the losing party. Id. at 31–32. While this may represent a meaningful number, it
seems to indicate an incremental, as opposed to a decisive, level of predisposition on the relevant
topics.
181. See Richard M. Mosk, Deliberations of Arbitrators, in PRACTISING VIRTUE, supra note
153, at 486 (“An important component of any dispute resolution mechanism involving more than
one decision-maker is the deliberation among those decision-makers.”).
182. An arbitrator who seeks to persuade other members of a tribunal has to lay out convincing
facts and arguments to support his or her position on the merits. Yves Derains, The Arbitrator’s
Deliberation, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 911, 922 (2012). In other words, deliberations among coarbitrators mean that “the ‘quality of justice’ is likely to be less subject to the predispositions and
characteristics of an individual member and ensure a greater testing of points by discussion and
debate.” NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 250
(5th ed. 2009). To the extent that convincing justifications are lacking, and the arbitrator appears
to be motivated by bias, that person’s influence on the deliberations will vanish. Id. at 266 (warning
that appointment of partisan arbitrators tends to be counterproductive because “the remaining
arbitrators will very soon perceive what is happening and the influence of the partisan arbitrator
during deliberations will be diminished”); ROGERS, supra note 28, at 331 (“[T]he party-appointed
arbitrator who acts overly aggressive or too overtly partisan will end up alienating other members
of the tribunal and undermining their own ability to effectively influence the tribunal’s decisionmaking.”); Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 112, at 632 (“[A]n arbitrator’s reputation for apparent
bias will undercut his or her credibility (hence influence) within a tribunal.”).
183. See Edna Sussman, Arbitrator Decision-Making: Unconscious Psychological Influences
and What You Can Do About Them, 24 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 487, 510 (2013) (emphasizing that
group decisionmaking helps to neutralize cognitive blinders, that groups can remember more facts
than individuals, and that deliberations among three people with different backgrounds and insights
can provide group members with a more complete picture, which seems likely to result in better
decisions than would be reached by any single member of the group). Put in slightly different terms,
the “absence of confrontation” inherent in the deliberations of a sole arbitrator entails the twin risks
of “prejudging” and also “being superficial.” Derains, supra note 182, at 922.
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deliberations, the fact is that in real situations they do not act as partisans
during deliberations. To the contrary, they end up joining unanimous
decisions in the overwhelming majority of cases. 184
This raises the question of why party-appointed arbitrators who are
constantly on the market for appointments do not establish voting records
that would mark themselves as reliable supporters of appointing parties.
Another empirical study begins by hypothesizing that arbitrators act
strategically and behave in ways that are calculated to maximize their
overall professional welfare.185 In so doing, the study hypothesizes that
arbitrators not only have to appeal to appointing parties; they must also
behave in ways that will maintain and enhance their stature among a small
and tightly knit community of elite arbitrators in which membership
represents a key requirement for professional advancement.186
Turning to the effects of dissenting opinions on stature in that small
and tightly knit community, one should recall that dissents do not just
impose direct costs on dissenting arbitrators, who must invest time and
effort in drafting persuasive dissenting opinions.187 Dissenting opinions
also impose direct costs on the majority,188 particularly the presiding
184. See supra notes 162–164 and accompanying text (discussing the results of van den Berg’s
and other studies).
185. Strezhnev, supra note 164, at 8.
186. Id. at 8–9; see Park, supra note 143, at 653 (recognizing that “[t]here may be some truth
to the . . . assertion that arbitrators want to see cases decided in favor of the parties which appointed
them,” but explaining that “an even stronger incentive exists to safeguard professional status,” and
emphasizing that “[i]ndividuals who serve as arbitrators care deeply about the respect of
colleagues” and that “few enticements to good behavior are stronger for those who sit regularly as
arbitrators than a colleague’s appreciation of one’s ability and integrity”); see also ROGERS, supra
note 28, at 328–29 (explaining that “the field of international arbitrators continues to be dominated
by an elite group of insiders” for whom “[c]ollegiality, familiarity, and agreeability are important
professional credentials . . . and important qualities for career advancement”); Kapeliuk, supra note
150, at 68 (observing that individuals “who form a part of a close group of elite arbitrators . . .
develop interpersonal dynamics that lead them to act collegially,” and that “[t]he more these
arbitrators serve on arbitration tribunals and the more intermingled they are in arbitration panels,
the more one may expect collegiality between them.”); cf. Yackee, supra note 27, at 1611
(observing that the development of international investment law “has been placed primarily in the
hands of an exceedingly small pool of super-elite” international lawyers). Multiple studies have
concluded that a small group of elite arbitrators overwhelmingly populate investment treaty
tribunals. See Kapeliuk, supra note 150, at 75–76 (explaining that a group of twenty-six elite
arbitrators represented just 14.9 percent of arbitrators appointed in a dataset of 131 arbitrations, but
that at least one elite arbitrator sat on the tribunal in 80.2 percent of the cases); PIA EBERHARDT &
CECILIA
OLIVET,
PROFITING
FROM
INJUSTICE
38
(2012)
(ebook),
https://www.tni.org/files/download/profitingfrominjustice.pdf (asserting that an elite group of just
fifteen arbitrators have decided 55 percent of all known investment treaty disputes, 64 percent of
disputes with $100 million or more in controversy, and 75 percent of disputes with $4 billion or
more in controversy).
187. See Strezhnev, supra note 164, at 9 (noting that “dissents can be costly,” due in part to the
“additional mental work [required] to write a defensible dissent”).
188. See id. at 4 (explaining that dissents force the majority to respond to open attack on its
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arbitrator,189 who may feel embarrassment about the failure to build
consensus,190 annoyance at criticisms directed at his or her award,191 as
well as concern about extra work,192 delay, increased probability of legal
challenges to the award,193 and decreased likelihood of voluntary
compliance by the losing party.194
As a result of direct costs imposed on the majority, dissenting opinions
also visit indirect costs on dissenting arbitrators, who may find their
relationships with co-arbitrators tested; their reputations for cooperation,
temperance, analysis, and/or persuasiveness tarnished; and their standing
diminished within the small community of elite arbitrators.195 To the
extent that individual arbitrators do not merely dissent, but dissent
frequently, one would expect the costs to increase not just arithmetically,
but geometrically. In addition to the accumulation of direct and indirect
costs in individual cases, a frequently dissenting arbitrator would likely
come to be seen as an individual who lacks influence in deliberations.196
reasoning, that they reduce the precedential value of majority decisions, and that they decrease the
likelihood of voluntary compliance and enforcement); id. at 9 (“[D]issents force majority opinion
writers to work harder to credibl[y] justify the decision and respond to the dissenter.”).
189. Sheppard & Kapeliuk-Klinger, supra note 164, at 332.
190. Id.
191. Id.; see Strezhnev, supra note 164, at 4 (explaining that dissents can force the majority to
respond to “an open attack on its reasoning”); id. at 9 (explaining that “arbitrators on nonunanimous panels must sometimes confront vicious criticism”).
192. See Sheppard & Kapeliuk-Klinger, supra note 164, at 332 (referring to the “majority’s
efforts to justify the decision in light of the dissenting opinion”); Strezhnev, supra note 164, at 9
(indicating that dissents “force majority opinion writers to work harder to credibl[y] justify the
decision and respond to the dissenter”).
193. See Sheppard & Kapeliuk-Klinger, supra note 164, at 333 (indicating that the majority
“may feel that the dissent is laying the groundwork for a challenge”); Strezhnev, supra note 164,
at 4, 9 (explaining that dissents can increase the likelihood of annulment, as well as obstacles in
enforcement proceedings).
194. See Strezhnev, supra note 164, at 9 (indicating that dissents can weaken acceptance of the
award by both parties).
195. See id. at 6, 9 (discussing the social and reputational costs to the dissenter in a professional
context where arbitrators “have incentives not to cultivate animosity among their peers”); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 120–21 (1990) (“Every dissent is an
irritant to the members of the majority; hence a judge who dissents at the drop of a hat jeopardizes
the esteem of his colleagues.”).
196. Judge Patricia M. Wald has described dissenting opinions as admissions that the authors
have “not been able to convince [their] colleagues.” Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and
the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1412 (1995). See Michael Frost,
Justice Scalia’s Rhetoric of Dissent: A Greco-Roman Analysis of Scalia’s Advocacy in the VMI
Case, 91 KY. L.J. 167, 173 (2002) (“As a rule, dissenters are unhappy. After all, they have not
persuaded their colleagues to their point of view.”). One author describes the first year of Justice
John Paul Stevens on the United States Supreme Court, during which time Justice Stevens set the
record for the number of lone dissents by a new justice, and quotes the words that journalist Linda
Greenhouse used to describe him, including “unpredictable, maverick, a wild card, a loner.”
Christopher E. Smith, The Roles of Justice John Paul Stevens in Criminal Justice Cases, 39
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That would further degrade the person’s reputation among peers, as well
as his or her appeal to parties eager to appoint someone with the capacity
to shape deliberations.197 A pattern of frequent dissents might also reveal
an arbitrator’s predisposition to certain types of parties, or prejudgment
on certain types of issues, which would increase the arbitrator’s
vulnerability to challenge and removal based on justifiable doubts about
independence or impartiality.198 Even if not removed, the arbitrator might
lose the capacity for influence on tribunals not just as a descriptive matter,
but also for normative reasons, which would be much more difficult to
rehabilitate.199
Taking the analysis one step further, frequent dissents not just by
individual party-appointed arbitrators, but by the general class of partyappointed arbitrators, would raise concerns about structural bias. 200 The
perception of structural bias might, in turn, generate support for the
abolition of investor-state arbitration and its replacement with a
permanent investment court staffed by so-called “independent”
judges.201 As outlined above, this is no fantasy, but a key aspiration of
the EU’s investment policy and the solution actually achieved in
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 719, 721 (2006). These are not words that a party or counsel wants to hear
when considering appointment of an arbitrator for an important matter.
197. See Brower & Schill, supra note 123, at 493 (opining that “[n]o discerning party or counsel
will want to appoint as arbitrator someone unlikely to enjoy sincere respect for intellectual integrity
within a tribunal”); see also Park, supra note 143, at 658 (“Although teenage boys may . . . attract
adolescent girls by showing themselves dangerous and daring, no similar rule works
for . . . arbitrators. Rumors of . . . partiality do [not] enhance the credibility of professional
decisionmakers, who normally benefit from reputations for reliability and accuracy. Bad arbitrators
exist, but their lack of integrity does them no favors.”).
198. Cf. ROGERS, supra note 28, at 325 (explaining that the “polarization of investment
arbitration has led to allegations that certain arbitrators are ‘ringers’ for one side or the other, and
that those who are routinely appointed by investors are biased against states,” and observing that a
“number of high-profile challenges to investment arbitrators have added fuel to this fire”).
199. As explained by Judge Brower and Professor Schill: “If an arbitrator becomes branded as
distinctly ‘pro-state’ or ‘pro-investor,’ party appointments will be channeled accordingly. In the
latter case that individual’s reputation for such apparent bias will undercut his or her influence
within tribunals, which over time inevitably will decrease that individual’s market appeal.” Brower
& Schill, supra note 123, at 493; see also Sheppard & Kapeliuk-Klinger, supra note 164, at 333
(indicating that “when dissents are the result of bias, their costs to dissenting arbitrators might be
significant” even for party-appointed arbitrators in future arbitrations because, “even if the
arbitrator is selected by a party in future arbitrations, his/her influence among other members of the
tribunal will be diminished”).
200. See Strezhnev, supra note 164, at 2, 7 (indicating that if arbitrators were acting as perfect
agents for appointing parties, one would see high rates of dissenting opinions and, in fact, 2-1
decisions might come to represent the typical outcome).
201. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 26, at 167–75, 180–84 (discussing the features of investment
treaty arbitration that supposedly create structural impediments to the independence of arbitrators,
and proposing an international investment court to remedy those perceived flaws); see also Rogers,
supra note 27, at 241 (describing elimination of investor-state arbitration and its replacement by a
permanent investment court as “the most radical reform proposal of all”).
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CETA.202 Assuming that party-appointed arbitrators act strategically and
think long-term about their own professional welfare, one would expect
them to avoid behavior that might imperil the continuation of investorstate arbitration as an institution.203 For this reason, party-appointed
arbitrators have a vested, strategic, and long-term interest in not acting
like politicians.
Consistent with the preceding analysis, the author of the empirical
study on strategic behavior found that dissenting opinions can be costly
for the career prospects of arbitrators.204 Arbitrators who dissent in
investment treaty cases are three times less likely to secure future
appointments as presiding arbitrator.205 However, the study did not find
that dissenting opinions have a negative effect on future appointments as
party-appointed arbitrators, which led the author of the study to
hypothesize that appointing parties may view dissenters as reliable
advocates and, thus, favor them for unilateral appointments.206
According to the person who conducted the study, the costs that dissents
impose on peer relationships may be offset by the benefits of signaling
reliable support for claimants or respondents.207 To the extent that the
hypothesis seems plausible, the fact is that party-appointed arbitrators
seem willing to take that gamble only in a small percentage of cases.208
They must know that regular patterns of affiliation bias would be
disastrous for them individually, and for the institution of investor-state
arbitration on which they depend.209
202. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text (discussing the EU’s pursuit of an
investment court and the implementation of that policy in CETA).
203. See Schneiderman, supra note 80, at 254 (indicating that the tribunals in Loewen Group,
Inc. v. United States and in Methanex Corp. v. United States rendered decisions based on
aberrational reasoning that may have been designed to avoid the “blowback” with which Congress
would have greeted decisions against the United States); see also Brower, supra note 87, at 191–
92 (describing two lines of cases decided by tribunals under NAFTA’s investment chapter, and
concluding that the more recent trend, overlapping with the decisions cited by Schneiderman,
“represent[s] a decisive shift away from the promotion of commercial certainty for investors and
towards preservation of regulatory space for host states”); Anthea Roberts, Would a Multilateral
Investment Court Be Biased? Shifting to a Treaty Party Frame of Analysis, EJIL: TALK! (Apr. 28,
2017),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/would-a-multilateral-investment-court-be-biased-shifting-to-atreaty-party-framework-of-analysis/ (“If the system is going to endure, there needs to be reasonable
concurrence between those who create the law (the treaty parties) and those who interpret and apply
the law (investment tribunals). If there is systematic divergence . . . the treaty parties will . . . defect
in increasing numbers.”).
204. Strezhnev, supra note 164, at 5.
205. Id. at 5, 14.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See supra notes 162–164 and accompanying text (discussing the low frequency of dissents
in investment treaty arbitration).
209. See Sweet, supra note 113, at 21 (declaring it “suicidal for arbitrators to proceed . . . with
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In this respect, arbitrators in investment treaty disputes probably act
more like elected judges than politicians in democratic systems. While
this may still leave room for criticism and debate, the fact is that the
traditional format for investor-state arbitration provides a significant
counterweight to the problems of democratic dysfunction in host states,
and almost certainly does that more effectively than a system controlled
solely by the afflicted governments themselves.
CONCLUSION
In the end, the point is that investment treaty disputes often represent
political disputes for host states.210 The central dilemma facing ISDS
today involves the fact that the architects of investment treaty arbitration
conceived of the process as a means of “depoliticizing” controversies
between foreign investors and host states.211 Evidently, it often is not
possible to eliminate the political character or the political importance of
those disputes for host states. In fact, “depoliticization” occurs only in the
sense of removing controversies from the normal political processes of
host states and subjecting them to an international legal process, 212 where
a heavy thumb pressed permanently down on the investors’ side of the scale in cases with very high
political stakes”).
210. See supra notes 1, 6–28 and accompanying text (discussing the political character of
investment treaty disputes).
211. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace
Reputational Sanctions, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 259, 295 (2013) (“Part of the political function of
bilateral investment treaties is to ‘depoliticize’ investment disputes.”); William S. Dodge, InvestorState Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries; Reflections on the Australia-United States
Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 14 (2006) (“BITs offered foreign investors
the benefits of avoiding domestic courts in less developed countries and of using a depoliticized
process in which they could press their own claims without intermediation by their home states.”);
Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do
Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future?, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 70 (2005)
(explaining that “[i]nvestment treaty arbitration was created to provide a depoliticized dispute
resolution process for the adjudication of public law rights”); Anna T. Katselas, Exit, Voice and
Loyalty in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 93 NEB. L. REV. 313, 317 (2014) (indicating that the
“goal is often described as the ‘depoliticization’ of international investment disputes”); Daniel M.
Price, NAFTA Chapter 11—Private Party vs. Government, Investor-State Dispute Settlement:
Frankenstein or Safety Valve?, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 107, 112 (2000) (opining that the intent of BITs
was to depoliticize investment disputes); Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and
Limits of Investment Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 357 (2015) (describing the
depoliticization of investment disputes as one of the two main goals of investment treaties); Michael
K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats, 29 INT’L
LAW. 389, 406 (1995) (recognizing that “[d]epoliticization has been the goal of many investment
treaties”).
212. See Brower, supra note 1, at 367–68 (quoting Salacuse, supra note 28, at 156) (describing
depoliticization in terms of “the establishment of a legal regime empowering foreign investors to
‘resist the forces of change often demanded by the political and economic life in host countries’”);
cf. Price, supra note 211, at 112 (explaining that BITs and NAFTA’s investment chapter empower
investors to use arbitration as a means of taking investment disputes “out of the political realm”);
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the decisionmakers lack direct political accountability, 213 often have little
direct experience with the social, political, and economic context for the
underlying events,214 and have no mandate to determine whether the
challenged measures have produced beneficial outcomes for the greatest
number of people in host states.215 In this sense, investment treaty
arbitration truly is anti-democratic, and one can understand how it tends
to provoke indignation among stakeholders bent on having their way in a
democratic system.
At the same time, one cannot deny the need for safeguards against the
excesses and dysfunctions of political decisionmaking in democratic
systems, as evidenced by the existence of constitutions, constitutional
courts, and constitutional jurisprudence.216 The extent of limits on
democratic decisionmaking, and the selection of institutions to police
those limits, represent important questions for any state, or group of
states. However, in choosing among rules and institutions, surely it makes
Vitalius Tumonis, Adjudication Fallacies: The Role of International Courts in Interstate Dispute
Settlement, 31 WIS. INT’L L.J. 35, 43 (2014) (“Often, whenever a State brings a case against another
State, it will be seen as the escalation of a dispute to the legal plane and not its settlement. After
litigation, the loser will usually feel resentful, and this resentment rarely helps settlement of the
underlying dispute.”).
213. See Barnali Choudhoury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s
Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 819 (2008) (opining that “[i]nvestment arbitrators . . . are not accountable to
the public”); Franck, supra note 9, at 76 (indicating that investment treaty “[a]rbitrators make
decisions of international significance but are not necessarily accountable to the public”); Anna T.
Katselas, Do Investment Treaties Prescribe a Deferential Standard of Review?, 34 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 87, 148 (2012) (asserting that “[i]nvestment tribunals are not politically accountable”).
214. See Alvarez, supra note 174, at 452 (indicating that “high profile decisions taken by a
Government in the midst of a crisis can be second-guessed by persons at some geographical and
temporal distance from that crisis”); Schneiderman, supra note 153, at 411–12 (quoting YVES
DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS,
ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 69 (2002))
(describing the inclination of leading international arbitrators to prefer an analytical approach that
keeps them “meticulously aside from the place of all the social relations that produced the actual
conflict”); see also Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 26, at 375–76 (expressing support for
analytical tools designed to preserve the discretion of states in dealing with public emergencies and
to avoid substitution of “a tribunal’s determination—often removed from the events and facts—for
a state’s own analysis”).
215. See Alvarez, supra note 174, at 452 (observing that the mandate of investment treaty
tribunals is to decide whether the host state “has injured a single foreign investor,” not to determine
what the government should have done or whether its “‘emergency’ actions . . . were the most
beneficial to the greatest number” of stakeholders).
216. See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme
Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 785 (1971) (opining that the U.S. Constitution “must serve as a
‘living’ safeguard against certain sorts of excesses on the part of elected officials misled . . . by
inflamed emotions and calculations of immediate consequences”); Maria Foscarinis, Note, Toward
a Constitutional Definition of Punishment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1673 (1980) (opining that
certain provisions of the U.S. Constitution are “part of a . . . scheme designed to safeguard
individuals from governmental excesses”).
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sense to consider the possibility that stakeholders and officeholders
systematically make irrational choices on political issues in democratic
systems.217
Even if one concludes that the time has come for rules and institutions
that place fewer limits on democratic decisionmaking by host states, it
equally makes sense to consider whether the proposed reforms will in fact
draw large investors and important disputes into a new public justice
system, or whether the reforms will encourage their retreat toward old
patterns of private ordering, where large investors seem likely to have
more leverage, and where structural arrangements create fewer toeholds
for consideration of the public interest.218
Viewed from the perspectives outlined above, the escalation of public
concerns about investment treaties and investment treaty arbitration
makes sense, even though the substance of those concerns appears to have
little basis in fact. While a more rational course would be to moderate
criticism of investment treaty arbitration, and to exercise greater caution
in approaching the EU’s proposal for a permanent investment court, those
options seem politically implausible given the current environment on
both sides of the Atlantic.

217. See supra notes 29–71 and accompanying text (explaining that stakeholders and
officeholders make irrational decisions on political issues in democratic systems).
218. See supra notes 109–126 and accompanying text (explaining why the proposed investment
court seems likely to repel large investors, who have the leverage to bargain for contractual terms
and dispute settlement clauses more favorable to their private interests and, arguably, less favorable
to the public interest).

